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An understanding of the events between September, 
1938, and March, 1939, is important if one is to gain an 
understanding of the origins of the Second World War. In 
September, 1938, Chamberlain was proclaiming "peace for 
our time;" by March, 1939, Britain was preparing for war 
against Germany. This thesis is an attempt to determine 
what factors caused the British Parliament to make such a 
radical change in course in the short space of six months. 
The writer wishes to express his sincere apprecia-
tion to Dr. Douglas D. Hale, Jr., Chairman of the Advisory 
Committee, to Dr. Homer L. Knight and Dr. Alexander M. 
Ospovat for their helpful criticism a~d guidance in the 
preparation of this thesis. I especially wish to express 
gratitude to my wife, Ruth, for her constant encouragement 
and patience. 
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The foreign policy ot Neville Chamberlain, Prime 
Minister of Great Britain from 1937 to 1940, underwent a 
metamorphosis between the Munich Conference of_September 
29, 1938, and the British decision to guarantee Poland's 
independence. on March 31, 19390 At the time of the Munich 
meeting the British Government felt that Germany had valid 
complaints against the treatment she had received under the 
Treaty of Versailles and in the years that followedo 
Britain was willing to make an attempt to rectify these 
wrongso The policy of appeasement was the means by which 
this was to be accomplishedo However, by mid-March, 1939, 
there had emerg~d a growing demand that this policy be 
changedo Chamberlain's Birmingham speech of March 17, 
1939, marks the beginning of the abandonment of .appease-
-ment and the attempt to create a coalition to stop German 
aggressiono On March 31 ,. 1939, Britain pledged to support 
Poland if Germany invaded Polish territoryo The purpose of 
this thesis is to attempt to determine the main fJctor in 
the reversal of British policy toward Germany between Sep-
teinber, 19.3 8, and March, 193 9'., 
There have been any number 0£ reasons advanced to 
1 
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explain the abandonment of the policy that many had hoped 
would mark the beginning of a period of European peace and 
tranquillityo Some have said that there occurred in 
Britain a revulsion against various aspects of the Nazi 
regime which were unpalatable to the British publico Oth-
ers hold that appeasement was merely a policy of conven-
ience to be discarded when England felt she was militarily , 
capable of challengi~ Hitlero Another possibility is that 
appeasement proved to be unproductiveo That is, it failed 
to accomplish the goal of satisfying Hitler, but only in-
creased the German dictator 1 s inclination toward aggres-
sions It has a1.so been brought out that there may have 
been a growing revol-t among :t·he b:ackbenchers of the Conserv-
ative Party who threate~ed a shift in power towarct tbe op-
position .. The Government was faced with a threat of revolt 
until it convinced its supporters that the practice of giv-
ing in to Hitler's demands would cease and that an attempt 
would be made to halt German aggression" 
An understanding of the change in policy toward Ger-
many is essential since it has a direct bearing on the out-
break of the Second World War. Britain 9s abandonment ot 
appeasement and consequent support of continental powers 
as a method of halting German agg:ress:ton led to Poland 9 s 
refusal to negotiate over the question of Danzig and the 
Polish Corridoro When Poland was invaded by German troops 
on September 1, 19.39, England, because of her previous com-
mitments, was plunged into the holocaust that was to become 
3 
World War II. 
Traditionally Great Britain's foreign policy has been 
based on two main principles. One of these pillars has 
been to maintain peace in Europe; the o.ther, non-involve-
ment in European affairs unless British interests were 
threatened .. This policy evolved due to Britain's insular 
position in relation to the European continent .. However, 
her reliance on commerce for her economic well-beinghas 
at times led to periods of extensive involvement on the 
continent. In order to implement these aims, Britain has 
relied upon the balance of power principle and the main-
tenance of a great navy. A large navy was needed to pro-
tect the commercial routes of the nation. Thus it has been 
the navy that carried the major portion of England's de-
fense, while the army has been limited to garrison work and 
relatively minor involvement in major ·~ars. 
In applying the balance of power philosophy, Britain 
has lent her support to those power blocs which happened to 
be weakest at any given time. An example of this principle 
at work was the aid given to Prussia., Austria, and Russia 
against France in the period 1800-1814, and of the British 
alliance with France against Germany in 1914, and again in 
1939. The idea behind this principle was that if the major 
rival blocs were relatively equal in power it would. be pos-
sible to maintain the peace because war in such a situation 
would not be prof~table to either side .. 
These pillars of British forelgn policy underwent a 
transformation after the Fi:rrst World \\faro No longer could 
Britain rely on maintaining the largest naval force in the 
world, but was forced to accept maritime parity with the 
United Stateso Among the factors which had necessitated 
this change in policy for Britain was the advent of the 
airplane., In the age of mechanized warfare 9 moreover, 
Britain no longer occupied an invulnerable insular poai= 
tiono As Stanley Baldwin remarked in July, 1934v "When 
you think of the defence of En.gland you no longer think of 
the chalk cliffs of Dover; you think of the Rhineo•1 
Flexibility has also been a traditional aspect of 
E~landus foreign policyo There has been a tendency among 
British diplomats to view all treaties as temporary and 
subject to revisiono~ An example of this may be seen in 
the period following the Napoleonic warso Though Britain 
participated in the coalition of anti-Bonapartist powers 
and was represented at the Congress of Vienna. 9 she re.f'used 
to be drawn into any binding agreement that could maintain 
the dominance of the reactionary forces after 18220 
·; •. >-'· 
The doctrine of appeasement which dominated Britain 11 s 
foreign policy from 1937 to 1939 9 fits the traditional out= 
look of Britain quite comfortablyo If 9 for example, on~ 
1Arnold Wol.fers, Britain and France Betwe€/ln Two Wars 
(Hamden, Connecti"ciit":-··-Archon Books» 1963) 2 Po 2290 
2Ibido, po 2020 See_also The Foreign Policy o.f the 
Powers {New York: Council on Foreign Relations» 1935) 2 
PPo '60=64o 
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accepts as two precepts the idea of temporary commitments 
and the desire for peace on the continent, it is possible 
to argue that appeasement was but a modern technique by 
which the traditional goals of British foreign policy migpt 
be attainedo Appeasement was to offer a method of revising 
the Treaty of Versailles and to maintain peace in Europeo 
In short, appeasement was Chamberlain's approach to the ob-
jectives of traditional British foreign policy. 
The main purpose of the policy, as envisioned by 
Chamberlain, was to create an atmosphere of trust and tran-
quillity in Europeo Appeasement did not mean that every 
demand of the dictators would be met, but rather it was de-
signed to allow each nation ample opportunity to secure "a 
share of international trade, and improve the material con-
ditions of its own peopleon- The ultimate goal of this pol-
icy was to create an atmosphere of ttgood will and under-
standing" in which mutual problems ttcould b~ resoived by 
discussion without the us.e of force o n.3 
When viewed in the light of traditional British diplo-
macy, the Treijty of V:efsailles was open to severecriticismo 
Unlike France, Britain was not committed to'the idea that 
the restrictions imposed upon Germany in 1919·were to be 
' maintaified forevero As early as 1919, Lord Curzon, then 
3Keith Fei!!~ The Life of Neville Chamberlain {Lon-
don: ~cmillan, 194t), P:Po 320,3280 See also Keith Eubank, 
Munich {Norman, Oklah9ma: University of Oklahoma Press, 
1962), po 263 o 
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Foreign Secretary, declared that Britain refused to consid-
er the recently dictated treaty a permanently binding one.4 
The British were willing to revise the treaty to make it 
conform more readily to realityo Examples of this are the 
Anglo-Italian Agreement of April, 1938, and the Anglo-Ger-
man Naval Agreement of June, 1935. The Anglo-Italian Agree-
ment was designed to settle the various differences between 
the two nations, especially those over Ethiopia and Spain. 
The Anglo-Germ.an Naval Agreement, which allowed Germany the 
right to build up to 35% of Britain's surface naval capacity 
and 100% parity in submarines, was, in the British view, 
merely an official acceptance of the fact that Germany was 
no longer to be considered an inferior member of the Euro-
pean communityo5 
The policy advocated by Chamberlain was in line with 
British traditions. The policy took on added significance 
when it was coupled with the Prime Minister's own aversion 
to war. Under Chamberlain it became almost an obsession to 
end the possibility o:f war in Europe :forever. 
Chamberlain had been an active participant in 
4n101:fers, 202 212 214 W' PP• J . J • 
5Frank P. Chambers, This Age of Conflict (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace & World, 1912), pp. 390-391, 475. Chamber-
lain, himself, showed ~his.~endency toward appeasement 
even before he oecame Prime Minister. In June, 1936, :for 
example, he suggested that the sanctions against Italy for 
her invasion of Ethiopia· ,oe ended..e- Donald U. Bishop, The 
Administration ot· British Foreign Relations; ( Syracuse-,-
.N. Y.: Syra~use University Press, 1961 ), p. 122. 
)1 
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political life following a tradition that had been set by 
his father, Joseph, and his half-brother, Austen. His 
father was elected Lord Mayor of Birmingham, a post he held 
from 1873 to 1876, 6 and later served in the House of Commons 
where he distinguished himself as a political reformer .. He 
had entered Parliament as a Liberal but became a Conserya-
tive in 1895, when he joined Salisbury's Cabinet as Colonial 
Secretary. Austen had been Chancellor of the Exchequer un-
der Stanley Baldwin between 1924 and 1929. Neville had 
served as Lord Mayor of Birmingham, as had his father before 
him, and entered the House of Commons in 1918, as·the rep-
resentative of Ladywood, a section of Birmingham.? Between 
f919 and 1939, he held various Government positions. He 
was Minister of Health in the Cabinets of Bonar Law, Ram-
say MacDonald, and Stanley Baldwin. He also held the posi-
tion of Chancellor of the Exchequer three t~me~; ~nee in 
'·' 
MacDonald's Cabinet and twice in Baldwin's. When Baldwin 
retired in 1937, Chamber:J-ain was elecf;ed leader of the Con-
servative Party and served as Prime Mtnister until May, 
8 
1940. 
What kind of man wat the new Prime Minister? Like 
·6 Feiling, p. 2. 
7 
Iain Ma.el~9~ 1 Neville Chamberlain (London: Fred-
erick Muller, 19o1T, P•. 77. 
8Charles Loc;:ll ,_~9.!6-2:~, Britain Between the Wars ( Chi-
cago: pniversity of Chic~go Press, 1955), pp. 665-6720 
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most men he was a complex being, one not easily classified 
by a simple termo He was a difficult man to get to know. 
Chamberlain paid close attention to the details of govern-
ment, reading all documents that came across his desk. He 
also had great feeling for the underprivileged. Chamber-
lain told a group at Birmingham in 1937 that he had entered 
the House of eommons because he saw that there were many who 
were unable to provide the essentials of life for their 
families. He hoped to help correct the situation by "bet-
ter education" and "full employmento"9 
Chamberlain leaned heavily :,9n the advice of three men 
who tended to agree with his estimation of the foreign 
scene and reinforced his devotion to appeasement. These 
men made up the group known as the "Inner Cabinet" which 
had evolved from the Foreign Policy Committee of the Cab-
inet. Chamberlain believed this committee was too unwieldy 
to function effectively and so limited it to himself and 
three other men: Edward Wood (Viscount Halifax}, Sir John 
Simon, and Sir Samuel Hoare. 10 Simon was Chancellor of the 
Exchequ~r, Hoare was Home Secretary, and Halifax was Lord 
President and subsequently Foreign Secretary after Eden's 
resignation in March, 19380 These three men and the Prime 
9Feiling, pp. 203-204. 
10 
Bishop, p. 83. See also Alfred Duff CooperL_Old 
Men Forget {London: Rupert Hart-Davi~, 1953), p. 226. Also 
see Alan Campbell Johnson, Viscount H§llifax (New York: 
Ives Washburn, 1941), p. 474. , 
9 
Minister made most of the decisions on foreign policy. 11 
The government that Chamberlain headed was called a 
National Government, but the Conservative Party in fact 
held a majority of the Parliamentary seats. Out of o.15 
members of the House of Commons, the Cqnservatives could 
claim 432, while the Labour Party, the next largest, held 
only 154 seats. 12 Besides Chamberlain, the more important 
leaders in the Conservative Party were Winston Churchill, 
who, though out of office, was still one to be reckoned 
with, and Anthony Eden, who had served as Foreign Secretary 
from 1935 to 1938._ It was around Eden that most of those 
within the party that did not agree with the appeasement 
program tended to rally. Hoare and Simon were, of course, 
important members of the party. Lord Stanhope was Conserv-
ative leader in the House of Lords. In the Labour Party 
the leaders were Clement Attlee, Arthur· Greenwood, Herbert 
Morrison, Hugh Dalton and Stafford Cripps. The Liberal 
Party, which had been one of the major ~a.rties of the 
-nineteenth century, held only 20 seats. Its leader was 
Archibald Sinclair. The Independent Labour :Party'· was led 
by James l.Vfaxton, but had orily 4 members in the House of 
Commons. The Liberal Nationa~ Par~y, under the l~adership 
11 
Johnson, p. 474. 
, 12navid ill.tler and Jeanie Fx:~~I!J!l:.P:.i.. British Political 
Facts 1900-1969 (New Yo_rk =- - St-. Martin's Press, 1963), 
p·. 124. · 
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of John Simon, had joined in an alliance with the Conserv= 
atives in 1935» and won 33 seatso The National Labour Par-
ty picked up 8 seats in the General Election of 1935, and 
supported the Governmento The Communist Party won one ~;at 
in 1935, when William Gallacher was elected from West 
Fife., 13 Gallacher, who supported neither the Govermnent 
nor the Opposition Labour Party, was one of the most vehe-
ment critics of appeasement. 
The basic objective of Conservative foreign policy 
was to bring about a peaceful settlement of European prob-
lems. The Labour Party, like the eonservative, advocated 
peace in Eur,ope, but favored a different approach. It em-
phasized the principle of collective security through the 
League of Nationso By 1937, however, it was evident that 
the League no longer was an effective means of securing 
world peaceo The Conservatives, therefore, were attempt-
ing to re-create a new "concert of Europe" dir,ected by Brit-
a.in, France,, Italy 9 and Germany to replace the Leaguea 14 
During these years, however, Labour continued to advocate 
a return to collective security through the League and the 
settlement of disputes by peaceful meanso15 
13:i:b1d_~~ ppo s9-107. 
14Gordon Cra.ig and Felix Gtlq~r-~.JL The Di~omats 1919= 
1939 (Princeton» N. Jo: Princeton Universityess» 1953), 
p. 548a 
15Elaine W:ipd:r,J~J:h_ Bri ti~h Labour vs Foreign Policy 
(Stanford, Calif o ~~ _ Stanford Uµiversity Press, 1952), po 9 o 
See also Craig" pa 3130 . 
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Labour's attitude toward rear:mament was also closely 
tied to the idea of international cooperationo At the 
Edinburgh Conference of 1936, the party passed a resolution 
that called for armaments equal to the arms of those na-
tions which were not loyal to the Leagueo 16 In 1937, a 
Labour spokesman declared that the party would support col-
lective security through the League but would resist an 
arms build~up simply as a means to implement national pol-
icyo17 This policy was reaffirmed at a Birmingham Con.fer-
ence of .. the party in 193 8 o 1 g Thus, Labour's attitude to= 
ward rearmament was contingent upon its reliance upon the 
League as the means of-assuring the pe~ceo Apparently the 
Labour leaders failed to see the impracticality of this 
policy: England and France working in unison within the 
League could have little deterrent influence over Germany, 
Italy, and Japan since they were no longer members of the 
League and thus no longer bound by its Covenanto 
There were, of course, alternative policies which the 
Government might have pursued other than appeasement or 
collective security through the Leagueo Some 0£ these were 
not £easible and others were unpaiatable to Chamberlaino 
Happened (New York: The 
m_pr1merie 
12 
One possibility was to form an alliance with the United 
S~ates in an effort to halt not only German aggression but 
t~at of Japan ~swell. This plan held certain attractions 
for both natio~so Both were interesteq in the Pacific area 
and had posses~ions or concessions whic~ would be endan-
gfred if Japan were not stopped. 
Nevertheless, though there may have been some offi-
cial de~ire in Washington for an Anglo-American agreement, 
it was not to qome to pass before the outbreak of World War 
I+• The main reason for the failure of the two nations to 
cQme together was-the isolationist attitude of the American 
Pl!lblic during 4he interwaryears. Congress passed two neu-
trality laws whicp were designed to keep America from be-
cqming involved iri international disputes. 19 Another ex-
pression of th~s .Apterican isolation occurred in 1?37, when 
President Roosevelt proposed a quarantine of those nations 
t~at broke international law. Public reaction to this 
statement was ~o great that Roosevelt was forced to public-
ly disavow his peclaration as official American policy.20 
! . \, . 
Another possible course of action Britain might have 
eqnsidered was to form an alliance with the Soviet Union. 
'fqe Soviets had ipterests both in Europe an?, in_AsiaWhich 
19 The law~ ·11ere passed in 19.3 5 and 19.3 7. · The 19.3 7 . 
law forbade Americaµ citizens from traveling on belligerent 
stjips. 
20 ,_ 66 £.d Ghamuerf, pp. 4· -4~o. 
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could easily lead to open conflict with either Japan or 
Germany or both. Even though there were factors which 
could have been instrumental i~ bringing England and the 
Soviet Union together, there w~re still more that kept them 
apart. Among the~e factors were the different ideologies 
of 'the two nations and the faci that the military capabil-
ities of the Soviet Union were an unknown quantity since 
the great purges ,of the middle·tll,irties. 21 Moreover, Cham-
berlain suspected that the Sov;et Union hoped to incite a 
war between Britain and Germany.?2 
Because of American isolftion, distrust of the Soviet 
Union, and the inability c,f' .tlif) +~ague to act when '£aced 
with a crisis, Britain. had only 9ne .. course to fol±ow if 
European peace was to be preserved. Britain could only 
hope to create an atmosphere of mutual confidence and 
trust, thus setting the stage .fo~ international appeasemento 
Also appeasement fit into the tr~ditional foreign policy of 
Britain'and corresponded with Cha,mberlainva own philosophy. 
While Chamberlain set about implementing appeasement, 
the Foreign Office attempted to influence his decisions» 
but was enjoying little success •. The position of.the :For-
eign Office, headed by tord Hali.fax, was an entirely dif= 
ferent one than it had been before World War Io Prior to 
War .---,-
14 
1914, foreign policy had been the domain of the Foreign 
Secretary, who brol.lght to the Cabinet proposals based upon 
the e~ert advice of the professional diplomats in the For-
eign Officeo At t~e Cabinet meetings there were opportuni-
ties to modify or change policy, but this was rarely done, 
since any proposal placed before the Cabinet was carefully 
worked out beforehand and based on all available informa-
t . 23 ion. 
During the period between the wars, however, a change .. 
took place in the relationship between the Foreign Office 
and Parliament. For one thing, the House of Commons began 
to take a more active interest in Foreign Office affairso 
That the Foreign Office no longer enjoyed pre-eminence in 
the decision-making process was evident as early as 1919, 
when Lloyd George refused.to take foreign Office experts to 
the Paris Peace Conference, PU'G re.lied instead oni persons of 
his awn choosing. 24 The influence of the Foreign Office on 
Britain's international relations continued to wane. until, 
-
under Chamberlain, it was by.passed by the Prime Minister 
w.ith little rega.rdo The position ·of the Foreign Secretary 
had become a difficult one indeed. 
In 1937, .Anthony Eden had become Foreign Secretary un-
der ~hamberlain, a position p.e was to hold until March 1938, 
p:p ~- 1 5-1 6 .. 
p. 20. 
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when he resigned because he no longer had any faith in the 
policy the .Prime Minister was following. Eden was replaced 
by Halifax, a man in whom Chamberlain had complete confi-
dence, but the process of decision-making was not changed. 
The Prime Minister continued to distrust the Foreign Office 
and to make decisions with little or no reliance on the ex-
pert advice available there. This, of course, was nothjng 
new; other Prime Ministers such as Gladstone, Lloyd George, 
and MacDonald had by-passed the Foreign O'ffice frequently. 
It was by no means a departure from tradition for Chamber-
lain to interfere in the activities of the experts at 
Whitehall or ignore their advice.25 
There are two reasons for Chamberlain's assumption of 
the duties of the Foreign Office. For one thing, Chamber-
lain mistrust·ed this agency, believing it to· be· dominated 
by people who were pro-French. He did not want Britain to 
be caught up in a situation similar to that of 1914. The 
second reason for his interference was his belief in the 
power of per.sonal diplomacy. Chamberlain was of the opin-
ion that more could be accomplished in two hours of personal 
contact than in weeks of communications between ministers;~6 
Chamberlain held war in complete aversion and because of 
25craig, p. 5/+9. See also Arthur Sa,l~~-:r::.1. __ P-ersonality 
in Politics (London: Faber and Faber, 1948), ppo 67, 84. 
Se• also Lcleoq., p. 209. 
26 
Mowat, pp. 590-591. 
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this he believed that only a monumental effort on his part 
could assure peaceo The Prime Minister was confident that 
he had the answer for a lasting pea:ce in the. form of a gen-
eral European appeasement. 
There were, of course, those who opposed Chamberlain's 
monopoly of 4ecision-making power. Ronald. Cartland, a Con-
servative member of the House of Commons, accused the Prime 
Minister of behaving like the dictators in his actions and 
attitudes concerning the foreign scene .. 27 It was charged 
that there was a small clique outside Parliament that was 
forming policy to the exclusion of other views .. 26 Ne·ver-
thele ss, Chamber.lain dominated the formulation of foreign 
policy between 1937 and 1939, and was not necessarily ex-
ceeding the traditional powers of the Prime Minister • 
. Although appeasement was the official policy of the 
Government and probably had the support of the majority of 
' ' 
the electorate, Bri~ain still had obligations under the 
Treaty of Versailles, the Locarno Pact, and the League Cov-
enant which might run counter to this policyo · At the time 
27 · 
H.tJ,.gJ1 Dalt;~~J! . The Fateful Years (London: )frederick 
Muller, 1957), p. 102. ,, · 
28 .. 
ttThe Oppo~i t.~9~t;~. The Economist, CXXXIV (March 25, 
1939), p;0 6100 The article referred to the so-called 
"Cliveden Set" which many believed to be exerting undue in-
fluence over Chamberlain and the app~asement policyo The 
group included Geoffery Dawson, editor of The Times; Vis-
count and ViscounteJs Astor, in whose home the "Cliveden 
Set" allegedly met,'and Barrington-Ward, assistant editor 
of The Times. · · 
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of the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, in order to allay 
French fears of future attack by Germany, Britain agreed 
to guarantee French territorial integrityo If France were 
invaded by Germany, Britain agreed to give her military 
supporto 29 Also each nation that joined the League of Na-
tions assumed certain obligations toward the other membersa 
Under Article X, each member undertook to insure against 
"external aggression the territorial integrity and exist-
ing political independence of all members of the Leagueo·" 
The Lacarno Pact of 1925, provided for a British guarantee 
of the boundary between France and Germany.JO. 
At the Peace Conference concluding the First World 
Warp Britain hc1d pledged to protect France if France were 
attacked by Germanyo However, during the twenties and 
early thirties t.here existed a basic divergence betwee~ the 
British and French appraisals of the relative danger of 
Germanya France, assuming that her own safety lay in Ger-
man impotence, was determined to keep Germany as weak as 
possible so that her own secur1ty would not be endangereda 
Always on the horizon of French thought was·the fear of an-
other invasion from across the Rhineo For this reason she 
desired a demilitarized Rhineland under French controlo 
British foreign policy, in contrast to the French, 
29 
Chambers, PPo 106-109. 
30 
Ibido, ppo 123-124, $J4-8J9,. 
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followed the traditional standard of revision and temporary 
alliance when neededa The British desired that Germany find 
a "happy medium" between the limitations of the Treaty of 
Versailles and the maximum expansion of German power which 
Britain would tolerateo3 1 The maximum. level would be 
reached only when Germany began to threaten the Low Coun-
tries by her military build-up and when Germany had an air 
force that could neutralize the British fleeto 
By the summer of 1934, however, British and French 
policies had begun to mergeo On July JO, 1934, Stanley 
Baldwin announced that the frontier of Britain was on the 
Rhine Rivero By this he was drawing attention to the fact 
that Britain eould not isolate herself from the events on 
the continento What happened in Germany, France, or any 
other Western European nation could have an effect on Brit-
aino At the same time there was a growing distinction be-
tween Anglo.French and Anglo-German relationso Henceforth 
France would be considered a potential ally of Britain and 
Germany a potential enemyo3 2 
It was not until the Czechoslovakian crisis of 1938, 
however, that Britain emerged as a full participant, and in 
fact the leading participant, in continental affairso The 
<8fily obligations England had toward Czechoslovakia were 
31 . . 
Wolters, pp.. 233-244. 
32 . . . 
Ibid~_,_ f'Po 229-2300 · 
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those which came through me~bership in th~ League of Na-
tions. France, an ally of Czechoslovakia since 1924, had, 
by 1938, subordinated herself to Britain in foreign policy 
matters and was ~h~s looking to London for guidance.33 
Whep Germany began to make demands on C;e~hoslovakia it was 
London that assumed the role of leadership rather than 
Paris. Hence it was in regard to Czechoslovakia that ap-
peasement was given its greatest test and Chamberlain was 
. 
to say that he had gained "peace for our ~ime." 
However, appeasement did not bring peace. Instead, 
the eleven months between October, 1938, and September. 1939, 
witnessed the abandonment of appeasement and the outbreak 
. . . .. 
of war. Various explanations have been offered for the 
change in British policy fro~ appeasement to resistance 
against German aggression. 011e reason ofteµ cited as the 
cause for this reversal is tµat there was a change in Brit-
ish public opinion toward t~e Naz:i regime of Hitler. Among 
those who consider this to be a factqr art two well-known 
aritish historians, A. J.P. Taylor, and Lewis Ba Namiero34 
Taylor claims that there is no s~n.gle fac~or that brought 
about the change in opinion, bµt that one important cause 
was ~he Nazi occupation of ~ague on March 15, 19390 The 
33 . . 
11:>id o_, _ ;g. 280. 
34 
',l'aylor, po 205. Lewis B1_·,_9~ '·· !. am)--,J~p .. :!'0~~'7~:p13::t!fs~elude -······ 1938-1939 (London: · Jlfq.emil1a;ti·, '+o 
Mowat, Po 637. . 
public mood was different at this time than it had been 
during the Austrian Anschluss or the Munich Confereneeo35 
The exact role of public opinion, however, is dif-
ficult to ascertain because ~fits nebulous charactero 
20 
However, in a democratic society it is of great importance·, 
for on the caprice of public opinion rests the success or 
failure of a government's policyo Among the various means 
of determining the drift of public opinion within Britain 
at this time is to examine the letters sections of the vari-
ous newspapers and journalso Public opinion may aiso be 
measured by reference to the results of by-~lectiQnso If a 
Government-sponsored candidate in any contested borough wins 
by a large majority it may be assumed that the public is, 
at least in that particular area of the country, in favor 
of the course of action being takeno If this should be 
repeated in many dispersed boroughs, the assumption takes 
on added validityo 
Some authorities, on the other hand 9 suggest that it 
was Cabinet pfessure rather than public opinion that caused 
~hamberlain to abandon appeasemento The British historian, 
Ro Wo Seton-Watson, argues that the policy of appeasement 
was abandoned because of Cabinet influence on Chamberlaino 
According to this view» the Cabinet reacted against the 
apparent ·indifference of the Prime Minister to the oecupa-
35 Taylor, PPo 203-2040 
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tion of Prague by placing great pressure on himo36 It was 
this pressure that caused Chamberlain to take a firmer at-
titude toward Germany, an attitude that was revealed.in. 
the Prime Ministeris speech at Birmingham on March 17, 1939 .. 
Another factor that is sometimes cited as a reason 
for appeasement is the role of the dominion nations at this 
time. Every dominion, while recognizing the same monarch, 
was completely free to determine its own foreign policy. 
This made it important for Britain to take into consider-
ation the attitude of her dominions before ~~ting in a 
critical international situation. Great Britain, with a 
population of 50 million, had to acknowledge the role of 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and India wh'en she was con-
fronted with a revived Ge~many of 70 million peopleo Since 
the dominions were the source of manpower for the land 
36Ro Wo Seto.n"'.'~~~!9.P1 .. From Munich tp Danzig (London: 
Methuen, 19.39}, po 201. Members of Chamberlain's Cabinet 
between the Munich Conference and the outbreak of the Sec-
ond World War were: 
Neville Chamberlain •••••••••••••• Prime Mini~t~r, _ , 
Lord Halifax .............................. Foreign Secretary 
Sir Samuel Hoare ......................... Home Secretary 
Sir Thomas Inskip ................ ~Minister for Coordination 
of Defense 
W .. E. Elliot ...................... Minister of Health 
Sir Kingsley Wood ................. Secretary-for Air 
W. s. Morrison .......................... Minister of .Agriculture 
Earl Stanhope •• o.•o••o•••o•••••••First Lord of the 
Admiralty . 
Sir John Simon .................... Chancellor o:f the Exchequer 
Ernest Brown ••••• o•••••••••••••••Minister of Labour 
L .. Hore-Belisha ................... Secreta.fY for War 
E. L. Burgin .............. o•o•••••Minister of Transport 
Major Go C .. Tryon ................. Postmast,er General 
armies which would be needeq for any European war, they 
could wield great influenc, in the determination of Brit-
ish foreign policy. 
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Another factor in the abandonment ,of appeasement that 
is considered to be crucial is the role that Parliament 
played. Traditionally the role of Parliainent in the formu-
lation of foreign policy ha, been passive, but there is 
evidence that there was a re-evaluation of its role at this 
time. Historically, Parliament has allowed the Foreign 
Office, in co-operation wit4 the Prime Minister, to formu-
late-foreign policy. Since the First World War, however, 
there was a growing interest on the part of Parliament in 
the manipulation of foreign affairs. This has caused the· 
Government to keep Parliament well informed and seek a 
strong backing from that body for Government policies.37 
All of these forces--public opinion, the Foreign 
Office, the Dominions, and Chamberlain himself--played a 
part in the change in British policy toward Germany be-
tween September, 1938, and March, 1939. This thesis shall 
deal with only one of these possible reaspns: the role 
o-f Parliament. This factor seems to be the most signifi-
cant when considering the changing attitude toward Germany. 
37H. _M .. Stoaj;,_,. British Government (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1953), p. 319. 
CHAPTER II 
THE MUNICH SETTLEMENT AND THE REACTION 
IN PARLIAMENT AND NATION 
September, 1938, may be characterized as a montP of 
gradually increasing concern and sudden relief in Britain. 
Throughout the month the general consensus within England 
was that war was going to break out momentarily over the 
Sudeten question despite Britain's attempts to avert the 
catastrophe. After the Munich agreement of September 29, 
however, a deep feeling of relief pervaded the country, 
because it was now believed that war had been postponed, at 
the very least, for the near future. Since Munich is of 
such importance to an understanding of the British mood, it 
will be necessary to examine the agreement more closelyo 
The events leading to the Munich Conference had been 
set in motion once it hecame apparent that France, which 
had treaty obligations toward Czechoslovakia, had subor-
dinated her foreign policy aims to the desires of Great 
Britain: an England tha·t had no obligations toward the 
Czech state other than those which went along with member-
ship in the League of Nations. Other factors to be con-
sidered are the British estimate of Konrad Henlein~ the 
leader of the Sudeten Germany Party, and the designs of 
23 
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Adolph Hitler on Czechslovakiao The British assumed that 
Henlein was a patriot working for the rectification 0£ 
wrongs perpetrated upon the three and a half million Ger-
man-speaking inhabitants within Czechoslovakiao1 It was 
believed that he was seeking only justice for his peopleo 
Unfortunately, this was not the case. Henlein was nothing 
more than a pawn in the hands of Hitler, al,'l<i his Sudeten 
Party was under the control of the German Minister in 
Prague, whose orders the party was to obey completelya2 
That Hitler had designs on Central Europe was re-
vealed on.November 5, 1937, at a secret meeting with his 
g~nerals. In this meeting he declared that Germany needed 
Lebensraum in Central Europe, and the best opportunities 
to gain this territory were in Austria and Czechoslovakiaa3 
On February 20, 193g, in a speech before the Reichstag, 
Hitler made an allusion to this when he emphasized that 
Germany had a right tQ_ protect the "over .ten million Ger-
mans Lf-ivini/ in two of the States adjoining our frontierso" 
The Czech leaders were aware that Hitler was addressing him-
self to Prague as well as Viennao4 With the successful 
1Keith Eub;nk, Munich (Norman, Oklahoma: Oklahoma 
University Press, 1963), pp. B-9o 
2John Wheeler-Bennett, Munich: Prologue to Tragedy 
(New York: Buell, Sloan and Pearce, 1948), po 45. 
3William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third 
.Reich (New Yor~: Simon and Schuster, 1960}, pp. 305-3070 
4 Wbeeler~Bennett, p. 290 
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conclusion of the Austrian Anschluss in March, 1938, Hitler 
was ready to turn to Czechoslovakiao 
The Czechs were not willing merely to wait for Hit-
ler's next moveo Because of rumoured troop movements 
toward the Czech borders in the spring of 1938, the Czech 
Government, believing that an invasion was imminent, ordered 
the partial mobilization of the nation's forces on May 20. 
The immediate r~action of France was to pledge her sup-
port in the event of any German aggression. Russia also 
gave evidence of being ready to come to the aid of Czecho-
slovakia in the event of unwarranted aggression by Ger-
manyo5 Hitler, enraged because the Czech mobiliz:ation had 
~hwarted his plans, now determined to isola~,e and,annihilate 
Czechoslovakiao This was to be accomplished through the 
implementation. of "Operation Green." October 1 , 1939·, was 
the date given as the deadline for putting the plan into 
effect.6 For the time being, however, the qrisis.over 
Czechoslovakia had been averted, and the Czech nation rested 
secure in the knowledge that her allies were going to stand 
firm in the time of needo 
But in the late spring and early summer of 1938, 
Britain arid France began to vacillate in their policyo 
After the unnerving experience of the May cris:i.s,.Paris 
5Ibido, PPo 55,57. See also Chambers, Po 4810 
6Wbeeler-Bennett, pp. 60-61. 
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and London decided that the only way to preserve the peace 
was to force a reconciliation between the Reich and Czecho-
slovakiao This was to be accomplished by applying diplo-
matic pressure on both governmentso To Germany, Britain 
and France reaffirmed their determination to stand by 
Czechoslovakiao At the same time they threatened to with-
draw their support from the Czechs unless Prague proved 
willing to settle the Sudeten German problem by negoti-
ating with Germanyo7 
The implemen~ation of this plan proved to be only 
partially successful. Czechoslovakia was indeed cajoled 
into placing her destinies in the hands of her allies. 
This was done because the Czechs believed that Britain and 
France would insure that a just settlement would be brought 
about. Germany, however, was not impressed by these warn-
ings. The main reason £or their attitude was the activity 
of the British ambassador to Germany, Nevile. Henderson. 
While the British Government was issuing these warnings, 
Henderson was reassuring the German Government that they 
had nothing to £ear from Engiand because England was de-
sirous of peace. Henderson's activity undermined the at~ 
tempts of the British to bring Germany to the conference 
table where a just settlement could be achieved. Henderson 
also played a vital role in the decision-making process 
7 Ibid., p~ 71; Crai,g, Po 541. 
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concerning the steps the British Government was to take in 
the critical months before the Munich Conference. 8 
Hen~erson believed that pressure applied tQ Czecho-
slovakia would be more effective than that applied to Ger-
manyo As a result of this ·he often failed to carry out the 
directives he received from the Foreign Office. Henderson 
softened the impact of British representations at Berlin by 
nexpressing a purely personal opiniontt that was favorable 
i 
to the German viewpointo This "personal opinion" was 
clearly in sympathy with the German position.9 The ambas-
sador's actions undermined the British plan while it gave 
Germany room to maneuver. The German policy makers were 
confident that Britain would not come to the aid of the 
Czechs unless they pushed too far too rapidly. Henderson's 
attitude tended to support the German conviction that Brit-
ain would not object to changes in the European status quo 
if they could be brought about peacefully.10 
Germany, reasonably sure of the British attitude con-
cerning the Sudeten question, began to apply pressure on the 
Czech Government throu$h Henlein's Sudeten German Party. 
8Henderson took the attitude that Prague should give 
in to the demands of Germany. He was dissatisfied with the 
decision to approach both capitals, and the German govern-
ment was well aware of Henderson's attitude. Craig, p. 
538, 541. 
9 Ibid., pp. 538-540. 
1 OEubank, p. 1 9. 
I• 
One example of this may be seen in the eight demands put 
forth ~y the leader of the party at Karlsbad in April, 
1938. Henlein was instructed to raise these demands at 
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any time it appeared that Czechoslovakia was about to ac-
cept themo 11 Britain's reaction to this new development 
was to propose an independent mission to investigate and 
mediate the controversy. 12 The man given the responsibil-
ity of carrying out this assignment was Walter Runciman, 
former President of the Board of Trade and a successful 
ship buildero In Britain it was a foregone conclusion that 
Czechoslovakia would accept the plan and the settlement that 
hopefully would be forthcom;ngo If Prague should oppose 
the idea, the British were prepared to make their proposal 
public along with the Czech refusal. This would have placed 
the stigma of refusal to settle the Sudeten question square-
ly on Czechoslovakia. 13 Chamberlain emphasized that Runci-
man was to be an impartial investigator, looking at both 
sides and then perhaps proposing a settlement equitable 
for both parties. 14 
11 Eo Jo Knapton and T. Ko Derry, Europe and the World 
Since 1914 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1966L, Po _1 
2450 
12Wheeler-Bennett, Po 750 
13 
Eubank, .PPo 78-79 o 
14wheeler-Bennett, p. 750 See also Francis Lo Loewen-
heim, (edo), Peace or Appeasement? (Boston:. Houghton Mif-
flin Coo, 1965), pp. #18-19 o 
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The Runciman mission arrived at Prague in August, 
1938, and began to hold interviews with the contending par-
tieso However, it soon became evident that there were 
problems that could not be easily surmountedo The Sudeten 
Germans had been instructed to ffhold out and waitott15 Hen-
lein demanded that his Karlsbad program of April, calling 
for autonomy for the Sudeten areas, plus the right of the 
Sudeten Germ.ans "to profess German political philosophytt 
be aeceptedo 16 The Czechs, for their Jjart, refused to 
acknowledge these demands as a basis_for negotiations. It 
soon appeared that the mission was to end in failure. How-
ever, Dr. Ife"nei; President of Czechoslovakia, in order to 
prove to Runciman and the world that Henlein did not desire 
to settle the question, brought the negotiations to a hea9 
on September 4o He called in two of the leaders of the 
Sudeten Party and offered to fulfill their demands without 
attempting to compromise on any pointo 17 This would have 
placed the responsibility for failure squarely on the 
Sudeten German Partyo However, Henlein's group was saved 
from having to make a decision by an incident between 
Czechs and Sudeten Germans in the town of Morawska-Ostrava. 
This incident was used as a pretext to halt negotiations 
15 Eubank, p. 90. 
16 
Chamber$, p. 481. 
17 Eubank, Po 92; Wheeler-Bennett, Po 91. 
JQ 
until after Hitler's speech at the Nazi Party rally at 
Nuremberg on September 12o 1g In this very bellicose ad-
dress, Hitler demanded that the Sudeten Germans be granted 
the right of self-determinationo 19 
In the meantime, Hitler was given added incentive for 
maintaining pressure on Czechoslovakiao This took the form 
of an editorial in The Times of September 7, 1938, which 
suggested that Czechoslovakia give freedom to her minority 
20 groups and thus render its population more homogeneouso 
It was generally assumed that the editorial was inspired 
by the government, for it was known that there existed 
close connections between the newspaper and the governmento 
Although the Foreign Office quickly disclaimed any official 
connection with the editorial, the belief still persisted 
that it was an expression of the current gov~rnmental atti-
tude on the Sudeten problem. In this atmosphere, the 
Runciman mission had no chance of successo A final effort 
was made, however, to persuade Henlein to reopen negotia-
tions but he refused to do soo Runciman returned to Eng-
land on September 16, without making any appreciable 
18Wheeler-B~nnett, ppo 92-950 The incident that 
provided the excuse was alleged police brutality against 
Sudeten demonstratorso Actually the incident was blown 
out of all proportion by the German presso 
191 . nh··. oewe ... ei.rp., p .. x. 
20Quoted in Winston Churchill,, The Gathering Storm 
(Boston: Houghton Mif'.flin, 1948} , po 296 .. 
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headway in the search for peaceo21 
While the Runcim.an Mission prepared to return to Eng-
land, and Europe was expecting to hear of the outbreak of 
war at any moment, Chamberlain was embarking on the course 
of personal diplomacy that was to culminate in the Munich 
Conferenceo As the Prime Minister confided to his diary 
on September 11, he was sure that the plan he was pursuing 
was the best for Britaino He did not want the decision of 
war or peace for England to "pass out of our hands into 
those of a ruler of another country, and a lunatic at 
thatott22 
In order to preserve the peace at this critical hour, 
Chamberlain personally intervened and proposed to Hitler 
•. 
that they meet to di$cuss the highly volatile problem of 
the status of the Sudeten areao 23 Hitler 1 s reaction to the 
invitation was one of unrestrained joy,24 not so much be-
cause an opportunity had been presented for'a·negotiated 
settlement, but because he saw a chance to gain his objec-
tive without recourse to waro His bluff was beginning to 
pay offo Hitler readily agreed to meet Chamberlain at 
21 Wheeler-Bennett, Po 930 
22F ·1· 360 ei 1.ng, Po . o 
23Neville Cqamberlain, In Search of Peace (New York: 
Go Po Pu.tnamYs S9ris, 1939), ppo 186-1870 
24 Eubank, p.o 1300 
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Berchtesgaden on September t5o Within Britaini, the news of 
Chamberlain 9 s offer and Hitler's acceptance was received 
with renewed hope and a sigh of relief, for most people 
had expected war by the fifteenth • 
• 
Chamberlain went to Berchtesgaden with two compan-
ions» Hoarce Wilson, Chief Industrial Adviser to the Brit-
ish Government, and William Strangi, head of the Central 
Department of the Foreign Officeo 25 In the ensuing talks, 
the principle of self-determination for the Sudeten minor-
ity was acceptedo Hitler in return promised to keep his 
army under control unless the Czechs forced him to inter-
veneo Chamberlain returned to England believing that he had 
saved Europe from war because Hitler had given him his word 
that he would not make any drastic moves unless forced to 
do so by the Czechso The Prime Minister placed great faith 
in the sanctity of Hitler 1 s word, believing that his prom-
ises would qe kept becaus, the German leader had person-
ally given themo 26 
Between September 16 and 22 9 Chamberlain convinced 
the Cabinet 9 Parliament 9 and France that self-determination 
for the Sudeten Germans was the only"means available to 
preserve the peace of Europeo The French Fremier, Dala-
dier, and Foreign Ministeri, Bonnet, came for a series of 
25Wheeler~Bennett, Po 1080 
26Feiling, po 367; Daltoni, po 1760 
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talks that were initially stalled by French unwillingness 
to accept the principle of self-determinationo Apparently, 
French unwillingness centered around the fact that the 
contemplated plebiscite·would involve all the Czechoslo= 
vakian minorities and result in a partition of the coun-
tryo27 The question was finally settled to the satisfac-
tion of both nations when Britain agreed to guarantee the 
remaining portions of Czechoslovakia after the Sudeten area 
had been granted to Germanyo2S 
Next the Czechs had to be convinced that if they re-
jected the plan for self-determination theywbuld be forced 
to face Germany without British and French supporto Both 
Czechoslovakia an~ Germany had been mobilizing their forces 
during this time, and when the proposal to cede areas of 
over 50 per cent German population to Germany was first 
communicated to Prague on September 19, the first reaction 
in the Czech capital was to reject the proposalo However, 
once Prague was convinced that they could not rely on French 
27Loewenheim» po 1080 Daladier had been given a map 
before he left France, showing the minimum frontier Czecho-
slovakia needed to maintain if the country was not to be 
"surrendered and o o o ruinedo" He says that when this was 
presented to Chamberlain it only tended to strengthen the 
British positiono Thus he went along with the decision to 
ask Czechoslovakia to accept the idea of self-determination, 
especially when his government could offer no other solu-
tiono 
28 
Eubank, pp .. 134-1400 
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help, they were forced to accept the proposed settlemento29 
The way was now open for an agreement which would set 
at ease all parties concerned, although Czech acceptance 
had been gained only by the threat of virtual diplomatic 
isolationo Chamberlain once more flew to the continent 
only .to be told that self-determination for the Sudeten 
Germans alone was no longer acceptable to Germanyo At 
Godesberg, Hitler now demanded that Cz.eehoslova.kia also 
give Poland and Hungary those regions of the Czech nation 
containing Polish and Hungarian minoritieso The Fuehrer 
also set forth other demands in a memorandum that was lit-
tle more than an ul.timatumo 
.Amo:ng the new demands, Hitler called :for a frontier 
between the Reich and Czechoslovakia based on languageo 
Furthermore, the Czech police, army, and government offi= 
cia.J_s were to retire behind this line while the German 
army occupied all of the areao After this was accom-
plished9 plebiscites were to be held in the area using 
the .1918 census a.s a guide., It was also stipulated that 
there was to be no removal or destruction of Czech prop= 
erty within the area, neither was Czechoslovakia to receive 
any indemnification for state property ceded to Germanyo 
The final demand was that all Germans serving in the Czech 
army and police be released from their duties., In return 
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for the fulfillment of these demands, Germ.any agreed to 
sign a non-aggression pact with Czechoslovakiao30 
Chamberlain was astounded at these new terms and was 
understandably distressed that Hitler could not be per-
suaded to accept anything short of complete compliance with 
the new demands. Chamberlain, therefore, agreed to send the 
memorandum. to Czechoslovakia if Hitler would restrain his 
troopso He did not, however, agree to recominend that Czech-
oslovakia aecept~or reject the new demandso Hitler ac-
cepted this proposal and extended the date for Czech evac-
uation of the disputed ttrritory to October 1, 1938.3 1 
The British Prime Minister returned from Godesberg on 
September 24 only to find that there was a division within 
the Cabinet over the advisibility of accepting the Godes-
berg Memorandum.a Czechoslovakia had rejected Hitler 9 s pro-
. : .. ·. ·: 
posal as being an ultimatum. France also reJected: the new 
. ., ' . ' ·,' 
plan and in talks with Britain was attempting to ··soften the 
demandso The French felt that this could b~ aceo~plished 
by facihg Germany with a united front. Chamberlain, after 
much consid.eration9 agreed to follow the recommendations 
of the French and the majority of his Cabinet a.:ndreject 
the God.esberg Memora.nd\lmo However, he made one.last e.f.fort 
to preserve the peace by instructing Horace Wilson to 
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deliver a personal letter proposing that the Sudeten prob-
lem be settled by international arbitrationo Chamberlain 
hoped by this last-minute appeal to snatch the world from 
the brink of waro3 2 At this point it appeared that the 
outbreak of hostilities was only a matter of timeo33 The 
British fleet was mobilized on September 27, while at the 
same time trenches were being dug .in the parks of London 
and the population of the city was being issued gas 
maskso34 
The Prime Minister, as he review~d the past events in 
a speech before the House of Commons on September 28, 
seemed a bewildered old mano Then in the darkest hour, a 
ray of hope appeared in the form of an invitation from Hit-
ler to come to Munich for one more conference in an attempt 
to preserve the peaceo Apparently Chamberlain's final ap-
peal had had the- desired effect on the German dictatoro 
Chamberlain read the note containing what he believed to be 
the answer to Europe's problems and then concluded his 
speech by saying: 
I have now been informed by Herr Hitler that he 
invites me to meet him at Munich to-morrow 
morningo He has also invited Signor Mussolini 
32William Ro Rock 3 Appeasement on Trial (Hamden» 
Conn: The Shoe String Press, 1966), ppo 127-128. 
JJWheeler-Bennett, Po 1420 
34.Anthony Etj.en, The Reckoning (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin, 1965), Po 320 See also Chamberlain, po 1740 
and Mo Daladiero Signor Mussolini has accepted 
and I have no doubt Mo Daladier will aleo accept. 
I need not say what my answer will be.3' 
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At this announcement the Parliament erupted in pande-
. monium, and Government and opposition members of Parliament 
joined in cheering the Prime Ministero The House of Com-
mons then voted to adjourn until October 1, 1938, but not 
until various Parliamentary figures voiced their support 
of Chamberlain's third and most important journey to Ger-
manyo Archibald Sinclair, a Liberal and rep~esentative for 
Caithness, extended to the Prime Minister expressions of' 
hope for the.coming trip. He warned, however, that the in-
dependence of Czechoslovakia must be assured.36 Clement 
Attlee, the leader of the Labour opposition, welcomed the 
new opportunity to prevent war and also extended his will-
ingness to cooperate ttto give the Prime Minister ~very 
opportunity of following up this new move.n37 George 
Lansbury, Labour representative for Poplar 11 Bow, and Brom-
ley, followed the trend of well-wishing when he said that 
the nation was grateful and was hoping and praying that the 
trip would be a successo38 The lone dissenting voice was 
35Gr~~:t Brit~i~-"~-.. 2_.,Parliamentary Debates. (Commons), 
CCCXXXIX ( 193 7-193 8) , coo 26 o Hereafter cited as ijouse 
of Commons Debateso 
36 
·. Ibido, colo · 27" 
37Ibido, colo 260 
38 . 
Ibid", col. 27-280 
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that of William. Gallacher, the only Communist in Parlia-
ment, who charged that there were as many Fascists in the 
Conservative Party as there were in Germanyo He also pro-
tested the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, saying that 
true peace had to be based upon freedom and democracy, not 
the dissolution of the Czech nationo39 
The result of the Munich Conference of September 29 
and JO, was an eight point agreement which spelled out the 
manner in which the Sudeten areas of Czechoslovakia were 
to be added to the German Reich: (1) Czechoslo~akian evac-
uation of the Sudeten areas was to begin on October 1, 1938. 
(2) The evacuation was to be completed by October 10, 1938, 
and none of the existing installations were to be damaged. 
(3) There was to be an International Commission with the 
power to control the eva'cuation; the Commission was to be 
made up of the foU?' major European powers plus Czechoslo-
vakia o ( 4) A · detailed plan tor the German occupa-tion of 
' ' 
the former Czech territory was worked outo (5) There were 
to be provisions for plebisci.tes in disputed areas which 
were to be held under the supervision of the International 
Commissiono (6) The final boundaries _were to be decided by 
the Commissiono (7) Inhabitants were given stx months to 
leave any territory which had changed hands i£ they desired 
to leaveo (8) Any Germans serving as soidiers in the Czech 
39 
army were to be released within four weeks if they expressed 
a desire to be releasedo Furthermore, any Studeten Germans 
I 
serving prison sentences for political activities were to 
be given their freedomo40 There was very little difference 
between the Munich Agreement and the Godesberg Memorandum, 
yet the Agreement was accepted while the Memorandum had 
been rejectedo App~rently, the :fact that the .Agreement 
was ostensibly the result of international cooperation 
made it more palatable, while the Memorandum, a unilateral 
declaration of demands, was unacceptable~ 
Chamberlain did leave Munich with Hitler's signature 
on a declaration that pledged their two nations to settle 
by consultation any :further. question that eo_ncerned them. 
This served to strengthen the Prime Minister's belief that 
Hitler was amenable to compromise if approached in the 
right mannero When Chamberlain returned to England he de-
clared that the agreement reached at Munich represented 
ffpeace :for our timeon- He further let it be known that 
since the question of C.zechoslovakia. had been settled with-
out resort to war, ".further progress along the road to 
sanity" was now a distinct possibilityo41 
C!zeehoslovakia, the victim of the policy of appease-
40 · .. · 
. Frederick Lo Schum.an, Europe on the Eve {New York: 
Alfred Ao Knopf II 1939)' PPo 444-445 0 
41Chamber+ain, Po 2100 
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ment .ll was now pushed into the background of British policy o 
The British people, and especi~lly the politicians, con-
veniently neglected to concern themselves with the future 
of the Czechs until Hitler again resorted to coercion in 
March, 19390 However, the Munich Agreement itself became 
the focal point for a sometimes bitter debate on the ad-
visability of continuing the policy of appeasemento There 
was a certain element within Parliament and the nation that 
·had not accepted the foreign policy that culminated in the 
Munich meeting as the prescription for "peace for our 
time o "· 
Evidence that there did exist disagreement over the 
results of the Munich meeting was seen even before Parlia-
ment reconvened on October 3, 19380 Generally, opinion 
about the Munich Agreement was determined by party affili-
ation, with the opposition Labour Party being the most 
-
critical of the Agreement and the Conservatives supporting 
the Prime Ministero 
Among those who were having second thoughts about the 
results of the Munich meeting was the Liberal leader Sin-
clair who contended that "peace had not been e~tablished, "· 
and that true peace had to be based on the ttprinciples of 
law and justice backed by the firm will and close coopera-
tion of all those nations who loyally profess the•on42 
42'l'he, Times (London), October 1, 1938, po 60 
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Labourite Stafford Cripps, while relieved that war had been 
averted .for the present, believed that the recent action 
had only made the possibility of a .future war more cer-
taino43 Attlee also spoke out against the Agreement, call-
ing it a defeat for Britain and a victory for Hitler's 
Germanyo44 There was also a faction of the Government par-
ty that rejected appeasement, but since it numbered only 
about 30 members, its influence was negligible at this 
point. However, any group that included men such as Eden, 
Chruchill, and Duff Cooper was to be reckoned witho And, 
indeed, it was to serve as a rallying point ,+or those Con-
servatives who became disenchanted with the Prime Minis-
ter's foreign policy.45 
Despite evidence of dissatisfaction with the Munich 
.Agreement by opposition and Government members ot Parlia-
ment, the debate which began on October;, 1938,' was con-
ducted primarily- along party lines. For example, both Att-
lee a~d Sinclair, as leaders of political parties outside 
the pale of government, were highly critical of t;he Agree-
ment. Attlee considered it a "terrible defeat" ·ror 
43 colin.Cooke, The Life of Richard Stafford Cripps 
(London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1957), pp. 225~·227. 
·. .. 44e1ement Attlee, As It Happened (New York: Viking 
Press., 1954}, Po 146 • 
. ,._ _ , 45Eden, Po 4. Another .factor that limited the influ-
enel! of this group was its own lack o.f unityo There de-
veloped two .factiQn·s, one headed by Eden, and the other by 
Chr~chillo 
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democracy, while Sinclair viewed it as an unjust settle-
ment that could never be the basis for a lasting peace.46 
During the course of the debate, the Government was 
embarrased by defections a~d criticism within its own rankso 
Harry Crookshank and Duff Qooper both re*3igned their posi-
tions in the Government. Crookshank, Secretary for Mines, 
resigned during the deliberations over the Godesberg Memo-
randum because he could no~ support a foreign policy that 
appeared to be leading to clisaster.47 More important, how-
ever, was Duff Cooper's re~ignation. Cooper had served as 
First Lord of the Admirality and was responsible for the 
mobilization of the fleet on September 27. On October 3, 
1938, he resigned this position because he felt he could 
no longer support Chamberlain and the policy of appease-
mento4S There was also a conflict between -Cooper and the 
Prime Minister over the best method of making Britain's 
views known and understood in Berlin. Cooper was of the 
opinion .that the Prime Minister had only succeeded in re-
affirming Hitler's belief that England did not-represent an 
insurmountable obstacle to his plan of German domination 
of Europea49 He did not believe that the n1anguage of 
46 · - --· 
House of Commons Debates, 5th Se+ies 9 339, cola 
51, 680 
47 , Eden, po 32 .. 
48 . 
The Times (London), October 3, 1938, pa 19. 
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sweet reasonablenesstt would have any effect on a Hitler 
who "was more open to the languag_e of the mailed fisto •50 
Winston Churchill was also quite critical of the 
course Chamberlain had chosen to follow. He called the 
Munich Agreement "a total and unmitigated defeat" and be-
lieved it to be only the first, in what he feared would be 
a long series of defeats for Britain. He was also of the 
opinion that Bri.tain had abandoned her long commitment to 
freedom, a commitment that had to be ~eaffirmed if England 
was going to avert .future diplomatic, and perhaps, military 
! 
reversals.51 
Despite these defection~ .from Conservative ranks» the 
reopening of Parliament on October 3, made it clear that 
the majority of the Conservative Party continued to stand 
behind the Prime Minister and gave him their unlimited 
supporto Henry -Raikes,-Conserv.tive representative for 
Southeastern Essex., set the tone when lie came out in un.-
equi vocal support of the Gover;nment 1 s policy and recent 
. actions o He . argued that i.f war had been. averted for even 
a few y~ars, then Chamberlain's actions were e·ntirely 
justifiedo He concluded his argument by predicting that 
Chamberlain would go ffdown in history as the greatest 
50 Ibido, cola 34. 
51w1nston Churchill, Blood,·Sweatt and·T;ears (New 
York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1941 , pp. 4, 660 
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European statesman of this or any other timeon52 
C. To Culverwell, the representative from West Bris-
tol, urged greater fairness toward Hitlero Just what had 
Hitler done that warranted the virulent attacks of the op-
position?53 Why not give Hitler a chance to keep his wordo 
In Culverwell's opinion, the methods which Hitler used had 
been forced upon him and used only with great reluctanceo54 
The member from West Bristol was unable to conceive of a man 
who did not have a moral outlook, and when Hitler said he 
would be satisfied with reasonable concessions, Culverwell 
felt the German leader could be taken at his word. 
Another conservative answer to the criticism of the 
opposition was that peace was essential to the program and 
well-being o.f the German Governmento In their conviction 
that peace was essential to Hitler, the Conservatives de-
luded themselves into thinking that he would do nothing to 
upset the delicate balance of peace and precipitate a crisis 
that would prove his undoingo Another favorite argument of 
the Conservatives was that Britain was not·prepared to fight 
a war in 1938, and that by postponing war for even a year, 
the nation would have a chance to arm and be in a better 
52House of Commons De'bates .t .. ?~h.. SerJ.e.s,. JJ9, cols. 94, 
53Ibid., co~. 105. 
54Ibid., col. 109. 
45 
position to face any aggressora55 
The Secretary of State for Home Affairs, Samuel Hoare, 
predicted that the period of appeasement would be one in 
which many old problems would be resolved, and he looked 
forward to the day when the dictatorships and the democra-
cies could exist together in mutual respecto56 Another 
Conservative pointed out that the Czechoslovakian problem 
was not important enough to warrant British involvement in 
a war in their behalfo "If we have to fight," he declared, 
"let it be a question of principle affecting us and the 
future of civilizationo"57 
On October 6» 1938, the first debate on the policy of 
appeasement came to a closeo The following resolution was 
passed by a vote of 366 to 144: "That this House approves 
the policy of His Majesty 9 s Government by which war was 
averted in the recent crisis and supports their efforts to 
secure a lasting peaceon58 The House of Commons by this 
action had given the Government an overwhelming vote of 
confidenceo The Conservative Party was firmly in command 
of the situation, and those on the Government benches who 
were dissatisfied, such as Chu.rcllill, Eden and Duff Cooper, 
55rbido, colso 119-1200 
56 .. 
Ibido, colso 161-1620 
57Ibida, cola 2640 
58rbido, cols. 557-5580 
were unable to generate any significant opposition from 
within the party at this juncture. 
4o 
-The reaction of the public resembled that of Parlia-
mento Many Britons felt the question of the Sudeten Ger-
mans was merely one of a minority people wishing to return 
to their homeland, and not an attempt by Hitler to domi-
nate Europe. Englishmen travelling in Germany reporte~ 
that they found the German people anxious to avoid war and 
very much in favor of maintaining peaceful relations with 
59 England. Hitler, at the same time, was also making a 
favorable impression. For example, Sir Ian ~ilton, who 
headed a group of British ex-servicemen touring Germany, 
spent the night at Berchtesgaden as Hitler's guest. He 
reported that Hitler and the German people strongly desired 
peace and good relations with England: 
After the discussions we had together I am 
sure that Hitler's attitude is strongly for 
peace •••• The general attitude of the 
people is undoubtedly strong for peg8e and 
they are filled with a fear of war. · 
An ar~icle in The Times by Marcus Samuel, who represented 
Wandsworth in the House of Commons, ref1ected the.belief 
· -.. that the German people were not going to resort to war as 
59The Times (London), August 6, 1938, p.;' 6. Chamber-
lain also gives evidence of this when he recounts the warm 
welcome he received from the German people on September 22, 
19380 This, he said, showed the German people's desire for 
peaceo Cha~berlain, Po 192. 
60 ( . 
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an instrument of national policy. Samuel believed that the 
danger was in the feeling of "claustrophobia" that prevailed 
in the German nation; if this fear could somehow be healed 
the possibility of a lasting peace would be greatly en-
61 hancedo 
Despite these frequent expre·ssions of confidence in 
the German will for peace, there were a number of indica-
tions that public opinion was undergoing a subtle change in 
temper at the time of the Munich crisis. During the month 
of September, for example, a number of warnings were heard 
concerning the dangers of the appeasement policy. In late 
September, when war seemed imminent, Eden saw among the 
English people a growing awareness that a stand had to be 
made soon if the tide of dictatorship was to be stopped .. 62 
Also the General Secretary of the Trade Union Congress, Wal-
ter Citrine, charged that Germany's demand for self-determ-
ination for the Sudeten Germans was only a pretext for ag-
gression in Central Europe.63 Another ~xample comes from 
the pen of Christopher Hobhouse, a writer for The Spectator, 
who said that he and his generation were ready to die "as 
other generations had done before them" for the cause of 
61 Ibido, August 1, 1938, p. 12. 
62 
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freedomo64 
Earlier, a National Council for Labour spokesman urged 
the Government to make Germany aware that Britain would not 
tolerate any attack on Czechoslovakiao65 In early Septem-
ber, The Economist reported that British public opinion was 
hardening as the people became aware that security could not 
become a reality while Germany relied on the methods of 
intimidation she was currently utilizing. The editorial 
further warned that should Germany start a war she would 
find a world united against hero66 
Those who issued such warni~gs represented but a small 
portion of the publico Most of the people were unperturbed 
by the actions of Hitler at ~his time, for they believed 
that Germany had some valid claims to make on the world b~-
cause of the dictated peace at Versailleso Many also 
accepted the vie\'! .O.f .. The Times editorial of September 7, 
1938, which suggested that the Sudeten problem was merely 
one of a minority group wanting to be united with its own 
peopleo67 
On the whole then, the immediate reaction of Parlia-
64 . . 
"A Younger Point of View," The Spectator, CLXI 
(September 23, 1938), Po 4740 · . 
65The Timss~(London), September 17, 1938, Po 120 
66 ", 
"A Clear Warning," The Economist, September 3, 
1938, p .. 442.. . 
67 Mowat, po 5910 
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ment and the people to Munich was favorableo Chamberlain 
was confident that he had cracked the armor of the dicta-
tor and that now peace in Europe was a foregone conclusiono 
As Arthur Salter put it: 
The party was united on domestic questions, and 
though, as the German menace grew 9 an increasing 
minority within it thought the GovernmentYs 
foreign policy too weak and its defence prepa-
rations inadequate» theirdissa.tisfa.ction was 
not enough to lead a. revolt ~0 0 o o Mro Church-
ill's hour had not yet comeobo 
68Arthur Salter, Memories of a. Public Servant (Lon-
don: Faber and Faber, 1961 ), Po 24fL 
CHAPTER III 
MONTHS OF INDECISION: 
OCTOBER, 1938, TO FEBRUARY, 1939 
On the surface the international scene appeared to be 
quiet between October, 1938, and February, 1939. Hitler 
was consolidating Germany's position in the newly acqui;ed 
./ 
areas of Austria and the Sudetenland. In England, Ch,.iil:mber-
lain continued to espouse the theme of trust in Hi;Ier and 
was looking forward to an era of peace and good feeling 
between Germany and England. The Prime Minister was still 
hesitant about accepting advice from experts on German and 
European affairs wit,hin the Foreign Office and relied in-
stead on the advice of Horace Wilson.I The British am-
bassador to Germany, Henderson, continued to undermine 
Foreign Office directives by expressing his personal at-
titudes at Berlin.2 
Outwardly it appeared that the status quo as qf Octo--
ber, ·. 1938, would be accepted and maintained by both Germany 
and Britain. The English were not attempting to create a 
coalition of powers to halt German aggression, nor did 
1Feiling, p. 327. 
2 Craig, pp. 538-540. 
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Germany appear to be planning any overt act of belligerence. 
The outward calm, however, hid undercurrents which suggested 
that all was not as tranquil as the exterior image seemed to 
indicateo A number of incidents during the period sug-
gested that Munich would not represent the last of Ger-
many's territorial demands after all; that Hitler aimed at 
German hegemony over eastern Europe. 
One of the most shocking events to occur in Germany 
during these intermediary months between Munich and the 
occupation of Prague was the Jewish pogrom of November 10, 
19380 The immediate pretext for the action against the 
German Jewish community was the murder of Ernst von Rath, 
a third secretary at the German embassy in Paris, by a 
young Jewo The German press demanded that Jews living in 
Germany be forced to pay·for the attack on a German life,3 
and on November 10, riots broke out all over Germanyo 
These riots had been planned in advance by the Nazis, who 
destroyed Jewish property and killed a number of Jewso4 
The degradation of the Jews did not stop with the destruc~ 
tion of their property, but continued when the money paid 
out in insurance claims for damages was confiscated by the 
·. ~Ogilvie.:.Forbes to Hali.fax, Berlin, _L.November 8, 
193~, Eo L. Wo9d~ard and Rohan Butler, ed.· Documents of 
Briti~h FQreign Policy 1919-1939 (London: His Majesty's 
Stationery O£fi9e~ 7951), 3rd Series, Volo III, Po 2610 
· Hereafter cited : as V.BFP. 
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German stateo Also the German Jews were fined one billion 
marks "for their abominable crimeso" 
The reaction to this night of bloodshed and carnage 
was immediate in Britain» and the population rallied to the 
support of the Jews with gifts of moneyo The Government, 
however, took no action to alleviate the situation .. The 
German Government argued that the riots were an internal 
German concern, and that all others should mind their own 
businesso Although the British Government was officially 
silent on the matter, there were a number of high ranking 
Government officials who spoke out against the pogrom .. 
Among this group were John Simon, Lord Zetland, Samuel Hoare 
and Stanley Baldwino5 At the same time there was some in-
dication that a few who had earlier favored appeasement 
were beginning to doubt that further cooperation with Ger-
many would lead to a lessening of tension .. 6 
Simultaneously, events were taking place in Czecho-
slovakia which indicated that the Czech nation was in for a 
very difficult timeo The Czechs were alone and unpro-
tected, completely at the mercy of Germany~ and it did not 
take Germany long to exercise her power over Czechoslovakiao 
5 R. G. Do Laf£an, et al, Survey of International Af-
fairs 1938, Volo III (London: Oxford UniversityPress, 
1951), ppo 162, 1650 
6Ibido, pa 1610 See also Frederick Schuman, Night 
Over Europe' {New Y9rk: Alfred A. Knop£, 1948),-p~-390 
§ 
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President Benes had resigned as head of the Czech state and 
was soon to find his way to England and from there to Amer-
ica .. V Benes was aware that he would have to leave his posi-
tion of leadership after the results of the Munich Confer-
ence were transmitted to his governmento To further empha-
size this, Hitler in a speech at the Berlin Sports Palace, 
on Septemper 26, had m,de a.n extremely violent at't.a.ck on 
Bene~j declaring that ~here existed a life and death strug-
gle between himself and the Czech President.7 On October 1, 
Czechoslovakia. was off':icially informed by the German Gov-
: I/ 
ernment that Benes wouJ_d have to resign from the Presidency 
of Czechoslovakiao It w~s hinted that if Bene$ did not 
resign the Czech state would be dealt with very harshlyo 8 
Therefore Benes resign~d on October 5, believing this ac-
tion to be in the best interests of his nation.9 
At the same time Czechoslovakia was further weakened 
by granting autonomy to Slovakia and Rutheniao There had 
been prior movements and agitation for Slovakian indepen-
dence from the Czech portion of Czechoslovakiao The two 
areas had different cultwal 'backgroundsll as the Czechs 
7Eduard Benes» Memoirs of Dr Ed;ard Bene!l) .trans. by 
Godf'rey Lian (Boston: Houghton Mif'f'lin Co., 1954), Po 510 
8Ibido Benes received the same information from the 
Czech Ministry of Foreign Af'fairs and from a number of 
unofficial sourceso 
9;bido:i ppo 51-52. 
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tended to be more modernized while the Slovaks were more 
oriented toward peasant agriculture. Czech political dom-
ination, coupled with the economic backwardness of Slovakia, 
created a conflict between Czechs and Slovaks when the 
areas were united after World War Io 10 This dispute weak-
ened Czechoslovakia in 1938, at a time when the nation 
could ill afford any internal strifeo 
On October 6, 19J8, an autonomous Slovakia was cre-
ated. The name of the state was now spelled with a hyphen; 
Czecho-Slovakiao This was done to emphasize the equality 
of the two parts of the nation. It is also a symbol of the 
weakness of the Czech nation after Munich. The former 
strong centralized state with its headquarters at Prague 
was now replaced by a federation of autonomous states with 
only tenuous ties with the central government. 
There were other indicators on the international 
scene that gave one reason to pause and reflect. For exam-
ple, Britain attempted to keep Italy from falling under 
German influence by bringing into force the Anglo-Italian 
Agreement that had been negotiated in April, 1938,, Basic-
ally the agreement called for British recognition of Italy's 
conquests in Ethiopia; in return Italy was to withdraw .. her 
volunteers from Spain.11 It was widely held in England 
10 
Chambers, po 1720 See also Taylor, p. 201. 
11 Rock, p,. 70. 
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· that Mussolini had played a major role in bringing Hitler 
to the bargaining table at Munich. Thus it was believed 
that the Italian dictator's influence could be used as a 
means of moderating German demands in Europe. 
Consequently on October 4, 1938, the Earl of Perth, 
British ambassador to Rome, notified Viscount Halifax that 
if London were willing to bring the agreement into force, 
Mussolirti would do all he could to create a "European 
detente and general pacification." However, he continued, 
if it appeared that Britain was not going to bring the 
agreement into force, Mussolini would be obliged to con-
clude a ffdefinite military alliance with Germany.n12 On 
' 
October 26, Halifax informed Perth that the Cabinet had 
agreed to bring the agreement to its natural conclusion.13 
On November 16, Perth and Ciano, the Italian Foreign Secre-
tary, signed the declaration bringing the Anglo.Italian 
Agreement into effect.14 
Another attempt to woo Italy away from German influ-
ence was Chamberlain's visit to Rome. This project of the 
Prime Minister was another effort on his part to keep the 
peace in Europe. On October 31, Halifax requested Perth to 
suggest a visit to Rome by himself and Chamberlain as a 
12DBFP, 3rd Series, Vol. III, P• 332. 
13 Ibid., P• 342. 
14 
Ibid • , p. 3 62 • 
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means of cementing "more cordial relations with Italy o '·' 
Perth considered this an effective move and arranged for a 
state visit during the second week of January 1 1939015 
Chamberlainvs warm reception by the Italian people rein-
forced his belief in appeasement, but little was accom-
plished toward weakening the ties between Italy and Germanyo 
On the other hand, Chamberlain could consider the journey a 
success because it brought him into personal contact with 
Mussolinio This, the Prime Minister believed, would further 
the cause of peaceo16 Another aspect of the Italian journey 
was the trepidation with which the French Government viewed 
the tripo 
To fully understand the French position one must be 
aware of the strained relationship between France and Italy 
at this timeo France and Italy had been in conflict with 
one another over Tunisia and Corsicao Both areas were 
under French rule but each contained large Italian minori= 
tieso When Africa was being divided among the European 
powers in the years between 1870 and 1890 9 Italy attempted 
to gain Tunisia as a colonyo However» it was France that 
finally gained the area as a colony in 1881, and by 1896 
Italy had accepted the control of Tunisia by Franceo How-
ever 1 there continued to exist an element of dissatisfaction 
15 
Ibido~ PPo 356-3620 -
16Churchill brings out ChamberlainYs view in The 
Gathering Stormj PPo 304-3050 
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within Italy over the turn of events.,. The other area. of 
strained relations between the two nations, Corsica, had 
been ceded to France in 1768, by Genoa o The fact tha,t it 
had been Italian and still possessed a large Italian popu-
lation made it attractive to Mussolini as another area of 
possible embarrassment to Franceo Corsica and Tunis might 
be used in the same way Hitler had used the Sudeten Ger-
mans: a lever to force France into a Munich type settle-
ment. 
On November 30, 193S, an anti-French demonstration 
took place in the Italian Chamber of Deputies. Apparently 
under government guidance, the Chamber demanded that Tuni-
sia and Corsica be given to Italy. Thus, when it became 
known that Chamberlain was going to visit Italy in January, 
1939, there was no element of fear in French governmental 
circles that Chamberlain might inject himself into the con-
flict between the two nations and bring about a situation 
in which France would be forced to accede to the Italian 
demands. Fear of this occurring was allayed when Chamber-
lain and Halifax stopped off at Paris and held a conference 
with Dala.dier and Bonnet before proceeding to Romeo17 The 
purpose of the Paris meeting was to assure France that Brit-
ain would not be a part of any attempt to bring about a ter-
ritorial adjustment in Corsica or Tunisiao The results of 
17Arnold Jo Toynbee, Surve of International Affairs, 
193$, Volo I (London: Oxford University Press, 1941 , po 
1760 
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the Rome meeting were anything but conclusiveo Chamberlain 
refused to enter into the Franco-Italian controversy and 
Count Ciano reported that the "visit was kept on a minor 
toneon18 The Prime Minister, however, believed that the 
journey had been a step toward peaceol9 
Another phase of this period which must be examined 
is the correspondence of the British Foreign Offiee with 
its representatives abroad. Tw'o foreign posts were most 
important to British diplomacy--Paris and Berlino These 
two capitals were the centers of British concern during the 
months between Munich and the decision to aid Poland~ The 
ambassador to Germany was Nevile Henderson, but during the 
months between October and February 9 he was in England re-
covering from an illnesso In his absence the position was 
filled by Sir Go Ogilvie-Forbeso 
Paris was also an important diplomatic post for the 
Britisho The two nations had pledged themselves to come to 
the assistance of one another in case of attack from Ger-
many during the negotiations over the Treaty of Versailles 
in 19190 The closeness of the two nations was brought out 
in 1935» at the Anglo-French Conference concerning Ger-
many9s announcement of rearmamento2-0 France was also 
18 Rock 9 ppo 185-1880 
19Feiling, Po 393. 
20Alfred Ao Havighurst, Tw'entieth Century Britain 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1962), po 2450 
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following BritainYs lead in the attempted appeasement of 
Germanyo The British ambassador to France was Sir Eric 
Phippst a man who had followed a family tradition by enter-
ing the foreign serviceo His diplomatic career included an 
ambassadorial post in Germany between 1933 and 19370 While 
serving in this position he had warned London that appease-
ment would increase rather than satisfy Hitler's demandso 
After leaving Berlin, Phipps was appointed to the post at 
Paris, a position he was to hold until he retired from dip= 
lomatic service in 1939021 
. There is ample evidence to indicate that the British 
Government was being informed of rumors of impending German 
moves during the months between October, 1938, and March, 
1939., Warnings were forthcoming from both Phipps and 
Ogilvie-Forbes as well as from other sources, both official 
and unofficialo It appears, however, that there existed no 
clear-cut indication as to what Hitler planned to do next, 
although there existed numerous guesseso 
For example, Lord Halifax reports that London received 
a message, in December, 1938, from a staff member in the 
Berlin Embassy which indicated that Germany was preparing 
to attack England in the middle of March, 19.,39022 A more 
21 Dictionary of National Biography 1941-1950, (Lon-
don: Oxford Universi!,Y Press, 1959), Po 6700 · 
22Earl of Halif~x, Fulness of Days (London: Collins, 
1 9 5 7 ) ' p O 2 00 0 
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reliable report came from Ogilvie-Forbes on December 29 9 in 
which he reported that Hitler's future moves were unknown, 
but one could assume that the German dictator would under~ 
take no foreign adventures as long as internal pressure 
within Germany did not reach serious proportionso23 
In January new rumors were received from various 
sourceso One concerned the imminent incorporation of the 
remaining portions of Czechoslovakia into the Reicho The 
rumors became so pronounced that Chvalkovsky, the Czech 
Foreig~ Minister, asked the German Foreign Office to dis-
avow any intention of annexing Czecho-Slovakia.24 At the 
same time the British Foreign Office, on the basis of the 
rumors, warned its ambassador in Washington that Hitler 
was planning some action for the spring of 1939, perhaps 
as early as late February. 25 At the same time Ogilvie-
Forbes received a report from the military attache at the 
Berlin embassy, Colonel Mason-MacFarlane, who stated that 
Germany would likely come to an agreement with Poland "leav-
ing herself a freer hand elsewhere.n It was also reported 
that there were indications that pointed toward a German 
23DBFP,.Jrd Series, Vol. III, pp. 544-545. 
24Laffan, Volo III, p. 2360 These rumors were appar-
ently coming from the Sudeten Party which may have become a 
little overzealous at this point, and began agitation which 
was premature. 
25 
DBFP, 3rd Series, Volo IV, pp. 4-5, Halifax to Mal= 
let, Jan. 24, 1939. 
military concentration on southern Europe for the time 
being. 26 
The belief that there would be no great pressure 
brought to bear on Poland was 011e widely held in British 
diplomatic circleso Halifax informed the British ambas-
sador to Poland that the Polish nation was safe, for the 
present, from any pressure by Germanyo27 The ambassador 
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in turn informed Halifax that this assessment was apparently 
correct, for Ribbentropp had recently reaffirmed the sanc-
tity of the Polish-German Agreement of 1934028 
Another area that was viewed as a possible territory 
for German advancement was the Netherlandso Halifax in-
formed Sir Neville Bland, ambassador to the Netherlands, 
that this possibility did exist and that such a move could 
be used as a means for securing a base for operations 
against Great Britain by Germany. However, the Dutch them-
selves discounted the possibility of a German attack against 
their na.tiono29 
One of the most astute observers of the international 
scene at this time was Ogilvie-Forbes in Berlino Even 
though he received numerous reports that covered a wide 
26T6id o, p. 23 .. 
27Ibido, po 11 .. Halifax .gained this impression from 
a meeting with the Polish ambassador to Great Britaino 
28Ibid o, p.. 1? o 
29Ibido, Po 16,480 
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number of speculations, m~ny of which he considered to be 
highly unlikely~· he continued to inform London on the pre-
sumption that they might contain an element of trutho30 
On January 27 9 1939, he reported that Hitler considered his 
military position in relation to Britain and France to be 
at its most suitable point for a strike at the two power·s 
than at any time in the near futureo Thus it appears that 
Ogilvie-Forbes believed that the possibility of a major 
war in 1939 was conceivable} 1 
The next day Halifax informed Phipps in Paris and 
Clive in Brussels that the danger period in international 
affairs would be in the latter part of February, 1939)2 
Even though there was a general consensus that Hitler was 
prepari.ng for a move sometime in early 1939 9 the Bri,~ish 
were i.n the dark as to where this aggression would take 
place" The French Government was as much in the dark as 
was Britain" The French ambassador to Great Britain» Cor-
bin, informed Halifax that Paris believed the next move 
would involve an aggressive act against Roumaniao33 
30 Ibido l) po 1 EL One such report came from Conwell-
Evans, Joint Honorary Secretary of Anglo=German Fellowship 9 
who in.formed.Forbes that Hitler planned to atta~k in March)) 
1939" This date was chosen because England and France were 
not prepared for a major waro 
31 Ibido J Po 300 
32Ibido J Po 390 
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Reports were coming in not only from Berlin and Par-
is, but from Moscow and Prague as wello From Moscow Brit-
ain's ambassador reported that a "reliable informant 
in Memeln was expecting that Germany would annex the city 
on March 15, 1939034 The date was correct; only the victim, 
Memel, was wrongo At the same time it was reported from 
A.H. Ho MacDonald, air attache at Prague, that a senior 
member' of the Czech intelligence corps had informed him 
that Hitler was not going to do anything about Czecho-Slo-
vakia but concentrate on England and Franceo35 
Britain, in the face of all these rumors and reports 
was not simply waiting for Hitler to make a move and then 
react to ito In February, Halifax informed Phipps that 
talks between the British and French General Staffs should 
"proceed on the basis of war against Germany and Italy in 
combination" and should cover all possible fields of oper-
ationso36 Three days later, on February 10, Phipps was 
informed that Brit~in would support France in any declara-
tion of war on Germany brought about by German aggression 
in Switzerland or Hollando37 The British Government would 
consider any military action against these two nations as 
34Ibido, Po 520 
35Ibid., po 650 
36Ibido, Po 79. 
J?Ibido, pp. 100-101. 
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a threat to the security of ~ritain.3$ 
Even as these discussions were going on, a new voice 
was being heard from Germany. Nevile Henderson had recov-
ered from his illness and had returned to his post in Ber-
lin. Once again his totally unrealistic belief in the es-
sential truthfulness and goodness of Hitler was in evidence. 
In his official dispatches he informed London that Hitler 
was not planning any overt w~rlike action in Europe. He was 
also of the opinion that the 1'stories and rumours" about im-
mediate German aggression we:re completely without founda-
tion. Finally he proposed tpat the British press begin to 
emphasize the "peaceful inteµtions" of Hitler rather than 
showing. "suspicion of them.n39 Apparently this report by 
Henderson had its desired effect.on Halifax, for a week 
later he informed '.4indsay, British Ambassador to the United 
States, that the latest information on the possible future 
moves of Germany indicated that Hitler had a·bandoned any 
plans for creating a crisis in late February or March, 
1939. 40 
It appears that Halifax, by giving credence to the 
views of Henderson, who had been absent from his post for 
a number of months, was totally disregarding reports that 
38Ibid., p. BJ. 
39Ibid., pp. 121-122. 
40Ibid., p. 159. 
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were coming in from other sources that were based more on 
fact than fancy. The views of Henderson were, of course, 
popular with the British Government and fit in nicely with 
the appeasement policyo There is also justification for the 
belief that a government should emphasize the peaceful in-
tentions of its neighbors when attempting to maintain good 
relationso However, there was little justification for 
abandoning a watchful attitude toward areas of possible 
German aggression in the futureo Even though Henderson was 
proclaiming Hitler's peaceful intentions to the British 
Government, and Halifax was obviously influenced by these 
reports, the Government was still aware that at any time 
Germany might create a new international cr~sis. 
' One example of this continuing vigilance was the in-
crease in British rearmament programs. There were two di-
vergent views about Britain's arms program: some believed 
that it was incompatible with the appeasement policy. How, 
it was asked, ·could Britain hope to come to a· lasting peace 
with Germany while she prepared for war? On the other hand, 
the official Government attitude toward rearmament was that 
it was entirely compatible with the policy of appeasemento 
The Government was walking the proverbial tightrope in that 
she was attempting to increase her defensive capabilities 
without bringing about an arms race with Germany.41 
41 
La.ffan, Vo~o III, ,PP• 145-1460 
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The defensive aspect of the British arms program was 
made public on October 10, 1938, when the Secretary of State 
for War, Hore-Belisha, announced that Britain's army would 
be increased to eighteen divisionso42 Throughout October, 
1938, almost every important member of the Government made 
some type of statement about the justification of Britain's 
rearmament policy and its relationship to appeasement as 
an instrument of national policy. Among these were Thomas 
Inskip, Minister for Coordination of Defense, Hoare, and 
Halifax. Halifax made perhaps the best statement on the 
need for rearmament as a step toward general appeasement 
and peace in Europe. It was his belief that disarmament 
by Britain alone would not bring about peace in Europe. 
He said that Britain's ultimate aim was peace by mutual 
understanding, a goal that might be attainable only by 
first passing through a period of armed peace.43 
In connection with rearmament, a new aspect of the 
character of Chamberlain is revealed. It would appear that 
the Prime Minister was not quite as naive as the critics 
of appeasement so often picture him. Chamberlain was an 
advocate of rearmament because it would enable Britain to 





footing.n44 Chamberlain was well aware o:f the :fact that 
Britain was operating at Munich from a position o:f weak-
ness and he determined that this should never again be the 
c~se. However, at the same time he reaffirmed his belie:f 
in the basic honesty o:f Hitler. He believed that Hitler was 
committed to the idea of arbitration of international prob-
lems, a belief that unfortunately was not justified. 
Britain's rearmament program did not start an arms 
race with Germany because Germany had been rapidly building 
up her armed power before England began her own rearmament 
program. Germany was in fact expanding her arms production 
at a far faster rate than was Britain.45 Within Germany 
it was believed that German military power, not a desire to 
revise the Treaty of Versailles, had.caused England to 
accept the Munich Agreement.46 
Within Britain the movement for rearmament also re-
ceived the support of Parliament. Even the Labour Party, 
traditionally pacifistic, was willing by 1939 to support 
rearmament for defensive purposes. The main goal of the 
44 Ibid., pp. 146-147. 
45According t9 Mowat, p. 628, British and Germ.an ex-
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party, however, remained the achievement of peace through 
a collective security system based on the League of Na-
tions.47 
Britain was concentrating primarily on air power dur-
ing these critical months. The major accomplishment at this 
time was the development of the Spitfire fighter that would 
play such an important part in the Battle of Britaino The 
development of the aircraft industry was carried out at a 
rapid pace, and by the outbreak of the war the air force 
was in a very good position to carry out the defense of 
Britain. 48 Even though the total number of Britain's first 
line aircraft was considerably lower than that of Germany, 
Britain's rate of production was much higher.49 
Britain 9 s rearmament program did not mean, however, 
that appeasement was a thing of the past or that Britain was 
going to take a more bellicose position in international 
affairso On the contrary, the general attitude,remained 
highly optimistic. Chamberlain wrote in February, 1939, 
that all the information he was able to gather indicated 
that peace was being achieved. Samuel Hoare·was of the 
opinion that a ttGolden Agen had arrived "in which Five Men 
47 Tucker, PPo 207, 2130 
48Mowat, pp. 626-627. · 
49Ibido, p. 631. Britain produced 2,827 first line 
aircraft in 1938; Germany 5,235~ By 1939, Britain had pro-
duced 7,940 and Germany B,2950 
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in Europe, the three dictators and the Prime Ministers of 
England and France • o • might in an incredibly short time 
transform the whole history of the world.,n50 
Unfortunately this attitude was not shared by Hitler., 
Already in the autumn of 1938, he was beginning to apply 
pressure against Poland for the construction of an Autobahn 
a.cross the Polish Corridor and the annexation of Danzig to 
the Reicho On October 24, 1938, Ribbentrop, the German 
Foreign Minister, proposed to the Polish ~bassa.dor to Ger-
many, Lipske, that the two nations reach an agreement about 
the future of Danzig, the Polish Corridor and the possibil-
ity of a Russian threat to both countrieso51 This reminder 
to Poland a.bout Germanyvs desire for a settlement of the 
Danzig and Corridor questions may have been the result of 
a note from the German ambassador to Poland, Moltke» to the 
German Foreign Office in which he reminded the Foreign Of-
fice that he had broached the subject of .... ~·.:t'! Autobahn across 
the Corridor in 1935, but had received no reply from the 
Polish Government.,52 Ribeentrop did not make this a major 
50Havighurst, ppo 275-276. 
51 United States Governmentll Documents on German For-
eign Policy, Series D, Volo VI (tvashington: UoSo Govern~ 
ment Printing 0.ffice, 1953), ppo 104-1070 Hereafter cited 
as DGFP., .All material cited in this study comes from 
Series Do 
52Ibido, Vol. V., ppo 20-210 Moltke now proposed 
that the Autobahn be built from Germany and East Prussia 
up to the Corridor boundrieso He believed this would pres-
sure Poland into coming to terms with Germany., 
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issue at this time because Hitler on November 5, let it 
be known that German-Polish relations were not to be dis-
turbed by the question of Danzig and the Corridor at this 
timeo 53 
However, by January, 1939, it was evident that Po-
land's period of grace had run out. Once again the tactics 
applied to Czechoslovakia were brought into pl.yo On 
January 13, Nazi activity in Danzig was ordered stepped up. 
This was to be done by forming a Schutzstaffel (SoSo) unit 
in the city, official adoption of the German salute, and 
adoption of the German flag.54 The groundwork was being 
laid to create internal strife within Danzig as an excuse 
for intervention. 
Thus the international situation, while appearing to 
be relatively calm, possessed all of the ingredients neces-
sary to bring about another crisis comparable to that which 
resulted in the Munich meeting of September, 1938. · Britain 
was attempting to bring her defensive capabilities to a po-
sition that would cause Hitler to think twice be.fore pre-
cipitating any foreign adventure. The British Foreign Of-
fice was receiving numerous rumors about possible actions 
to be undertaken by Germany, but these reports appeared to 
be simply rumo~s with little basis of fact. The inter-
53Ibid., p. 29. 
54Ibid., p. 162. 
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national scene was highly confused, but the British Govern-
ment, especially Chamberlain and Henderson, appeared to be 
very optimistico The Government saw little reason for alarm 
and was willing to continue to appease the dictators., Even 
those factions within Parliament which were fearful of the 
consequences of appeasement were unable to unite in a com-
mon front against Chamberlain's policy. 
The Labour Party, the largest of the opposition par-
ties in Parliament, was split within its own membership as 
to which course of action to ;f'ollowo One faction desired 
a coalition with the dissatisfied Con·serva.tives such as 
Churchill and Eden. One Labourite who supported this view 
was Stafford Cripps. As early as October, 1938, he had 
proposed that the anti-Chamberlain Conservatives and the 
Labour Party join forces in an attempt to unseat the Prime 
Minister.55 
The program Cripps wished to h1ave adopted could have 
proven to be a successful counter to the growth of German 
power. He called for "a positive policy of peace, by col-
lective action with France, Russia, fjni7 the United States 
of Americao«56 Although Cripps advocated a policy of col-
lective security, a mainstay of the Labour Party policy, he 
was unable to get his program adopted by the Party" How-
55 Dalton, Po 2000 
56cooke, p. 232. 
72 
ever, he did not give up but continued to advocate this 
plan. Finally in January, 1939, in a memorandum to the 
Labour Executive Boa.rd, he urged a united opposition to the 
Chamberlain Governmento The reaction of the Board was to 
reject Cripps plan and order him to stop the campaign or 
face expulsion from the party. Cripps refused to cease his 
activities and in April, 1939, after a bitter fight, he was 
expelled from the .party.57 
Thus, while there were a few people among the various 
political parties who were fearful of the threat that Ger-
man power represented, the majority of the Parliament was 
content to allow Chamberlain to continue in the pursuit of 
appeasement. Despite this feeling, there existed a minority 
that was not enthralled by the glorious promises of appease-
ment. Men such as Churchill and Eden were critical of the 
policy and they were able to make their criticism known and 
even gain some converts to their way of thinkingo For ex-
ample, Robert Boothby, an influential member of the Conserv-
ative Party, spoke out in favor of a rearmament program for 
Britain. 58 
Public opinion polls of this period also indicate 
that not all of the English people supported the Conserva-
57p,fark M. _.IC:r,l!&.i .... "Aneurin Bevan (New York: T. 
Yoseloff, 1961), pp. 54-55 o 
58House of Commons Debates, 5th Series, 341, colo 
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tive policies. In February, 1939, the question was asked: 
"If there were a General Election tomorrow, how would you 
vote?tt Fifty per cent of the people polled indicated that 
they would vote for the Government', 44% would vote for the 
opposition, and 6% were undecidedo59 By no means did all 
the electorate regard appeasement as the great panacea for 
the ills of the world. In February, 1939, only 28% of the 
people believed that appeasement would lead to enduring 
peace while 46% believed that it had kept Britain out of 
war. 60 Apparently the majority of the people did not share 
Chamberlaints great belief in the power of appeasement as 
an instrument of preventing war. Britain's people, while 
desiring peace and hoping f~r the-success of appeasement, 
were, perhaps,·a little more realistic than the Prime 
Ministero 
The months between October, 1938, and February, 1939, 
offer little evidence that any great change had taken place 
in Parliament's attitude toward Germanyo It is to the 
month of March, 1939, that we must now turn to find a real 
alteration in policy and the reasons why it took placeo 
59 Butler, po 132 .. 
6~ildred Strunk and Hadley Cantril (edso-), Public 
Opinion 1935-1946 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1951J,po275. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE HARVEST OF APPEASEMENT 
The month of March that was to witness the end of the 
appeasement policy gave no early indication that it was to 
be one of the pivotal times in British historyo Chamber-
lain believed that Hitler had been appeased, and most Eng-
lishmen were of the opinion that war had been averted for 
the foreseeable future. The Prime Minister's popularity was 
at a respectable ma.rk,l and The Times praised his unceasing 
quest for a peaceful solution to the problems of the world, 
calling this his "supreme achievement in the international 
field." He was further pictured as a man who, by his de-
termination and "by his journeys at critical moments," had 
brought to the people of Europe a faith in the ultimate 
victory of peace over waro 2 
In February, Henderson, the British ambassador to 
Germany, wrote from Berlin that he did not foresee any new 
moves by Hitler in the near future that might upset the so 
lAccording to Strunk, p. 96, Chamberlain had the sup-
port of 58% of the people polled in March, 19390 Unfortu-
nately, Strunk does not give the date of the poll or its 
source, so it is impossible to determine if the poll was 
ta.ken before or after March 15, 19390 
2The Times (London), March 6, 1939, p. 15. 
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recently inaugurated trend toward peaceo3 Chamberlain, in 
a press conference on March 9, expressed the opinion that 
more conferences would be held for the purpose of conclud-
ing general arms limitationso4 
This period may be described as the calm before the 
storm, for on March 15, 1939, all speculation as to Hit-
ler's future moves suddenly came to an end. On that day 
German troops marched into Prague and ended the idyll of 
British complacency. Before we examine Britain's reaction 
to this, we must first determine why Hitler so flagrantly 
disregarded the Munich Agreement and set the world on a col-
lision course with World War IIo 
At Munich Hitler had agreed to consult Britain if any 
change were contemplated in the status quo of Central Eu-
rope. However, he soon broke his word in the Vienna Award 
of 1938, in which he granted Hungary's claims for Czech 
territory without consulting either Britain or Fra.nceo5 Hit-
ler was already breaking the word in which Chamberlain had 
placed so much faith. 
Czechoslovakia was in an untenable position after the 
Munich Conference; her lines of defence had been taken over 
by German troops. The nation was further weakened by inde-
pendence movements within the state. Slovakia and Carpatho-
3 DBFP, Volo IV, ppo 121-122, 230. 
4Ibid., p .. 276. 
~Wheeler-Bennett, p. 297. 
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Ruthenia became independent provinces with only the most 
tenuous ties with the Central Government in Pragueo 6 Ger-
many was quick to support the autonomous movement in Slo-
vakia because it would further weaken the Czechs.7 
Why was Hitler bent on the destruction of the Czech 
state? The reasons apparently are to be found in the Mu-
nich Agreement itself. Hitler felt that Munich had cheated 
him out of using his army which had never seen action. He 
had also failed to achieve his goal of the complete take-
over of all of Czechoslovakia. Hitler preferred violence to 
negotiation; thus the Munich Agreement left h~m dissatis-
fied. He determined that this must be corrected by the to-
tal subjugation of Czechoslovakia by military force.8 Hit-
ler began to apply more and more pressure to what was left 
of Czechoslovakia, and when the Czech Government sought to 
salvage what it could by obtaining a guarantee from Germany 1 
pledging Czech independence, it was met with rebuff. 
Chvalkovsky» the Czech Foreign Minister, arranged to 
see Hitler on January 21, 1939. At this time Hitler de-
manded that Czechoslovakia ndo as the Germans bade" by 
withdrawing from the League of Nations, joining the anti-
Comintern Pact, and generally placing her destinies in the 
6 . . .· 
Ibid • , p • 3 3 7 • 
7Ibid., pa 339. 
8Ao Bullock, Hitler: A 
Bantam Books, 1961), p. 418a 
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hands of Germany.9 To further insure that Czechoslovakia 
would falter in her attempt to maintain a semblance of na-
tionhood, Hitler began to encourage the Slovaks in their 
demand for independence from the government located at 
Pragueo As the situation deteriorated, the central govern-
ment made a desperate attempt to regain control of what was 
left of the countryo The president of Czechoslovaki_a, Emil 
Hacha, dismissed Ruthenia's government on March 6, 19390 
On March 9, he dismissed the ·government of Slovakiao Hit-
ler used this as an excuse to begin the takeover of Czecho-
slovakiao He sent Seyss-Inquart, Governor of Austria, and 
five German generals to Slovakia to demand that the Slovaks 
announce their independence of the central governmento On 
March 14, Slovakia complied with these demandso 10 
At the same time the German press began to mount at-
tacks against the Czechs for alleged atrocities committed 
by Czechs upon Germanso The final act in the.Czech experi-
ment with democracy was beginning to unfoldo On March 13, 
Hacha appealed directly to Hitler, and on the fourteenth he 
and Ghvalkovsky left for Berlino11 When they arrived in 
Berlin they found themselves £aced with a choice 0£ either 
9 -
Ibid°' Po 4250 
;· 
See also Shirer, ppo 438-4390 
10Bullock, PPo 427-429, has the best discussion of 
this period, but it is also ably described by Shirer, ppo 
440-441 and Wheeler-Bennett, p. 3410 
11 
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peacefully submitting to German control or of fighting 
for perhaps two days and then falling to Germanyo Ha.cha, 
convinced that resistance was futile, acceded to Hitler's 
demands and signed the document making the Czech nation 
a protectorate of the Reich.12 On March 15, German troops 
entered Prague, and concluded the chapter of aggression 
which had begun at Munich six months beforeo But Hitler 
was not ret finished, for on March 16, he extended the pro-
tectorate to include Slovakia. 13 
The immediate reaction within Britain to the occupa-
tion of Prague was shocked disbelief and a groundswell of 
public opinion against the policy of appeasemento This 
sudden shift of sentiment was clearly reflected in the 
press. The general consensus now held that appeasement 
was finished and that a new policy based on "collective 
actiontt had to be instituted. 14 Even The Times, which had 
been the most fervent supporter of appeasement, recognized 
that the policy was no longer tenable. A Times editorial 
on March 15, charged that Hitler had never intended to live 
up to his Munich pledge and that it now appeared tbat 
Nazism was determined "to extend its domination wherever 
the weakness of other nations may seem to make extention 
12 
Ibldo, ppa 429-431. 
13 Sh' 449 .1rP-r, p. • 
14Rock, ppo 207-209. 
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possible o tt,15 The belief that Hitler was only attempting to 
bring Germans into the Reich and redress the wrongs of Ver-
sailles was shattered by the occupation of Pragueo No 
longer could Hitler be pictured as a man with just claims 
on the European powerso It was now apparent that he was an 
aggressor who had to be stopped if' Europe was to survive in 
freedom .. 
The opposition parties in Parliament reacted to the 
occupation with a surge of qutspoken criticism against the 
Prime Minister's policy. Most of the Conservatives, how-
ever, still remained true to Chamberlaino The most outspo-
ken of this group was Archibald Southby, a Conservative 
representing Epsom, Surrey,, who continued to express ex-
plicit faith in the Prime Minister's policy., He maintained 
that even though the policy "appears for a time to be un-
successful," it must end in an "era of world peace'' if' con-
tinued .. 16 Somerset De Chair, Conservative representative 
f'rom southwest Norfolk, declared that he had no "hesitation 
whatever in supporting the Prime Minister in that policy 
[of a.ppeasemen17. ,,17 Annesley Somerville, another Conser-
vative» believed that Chamberlain"s course was the correct 
course and that the people supported the Prime Minister and 
52lL 
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con,.tinued to have faith in himo18 
-~ 
Speaking for the opposition Liberals, Archibald Sin-
clair argued that Hitler was out to conquer the world and 
that while Chamberlain headed the government of Britain 
there was little hope of stopping Hitlero19 Hugh Dalton 
viewed the annexation with trepidation and said that Brit-
ain was in immediate danger from Germanyo Appeasement had 
failed, and Britain must tell Hitler he could go no fur-
thero20 Gallacher, the only Communist member of Parlia-
ment, demanded that Chamberlain resign and that a govern-
ment which represented the desires of the people be put in 
power.21 Eden, speaking for the anti-Chamberlain Conserva-
tives, warned that Hitler had to be stopped or else Europe 
would face anarchy and waro 22 
While Parliament remained split along the same lines 
' 
that had divided it since Munich and had not as yet felt 
the wave of popular indignati.on against the occupation of 
Prague, the Foreign Office was undergoing a ·changeo The 
advice of the appeasers was no longer accepted without 
questiono Halifax, the Foreign Secretary, was by March» 
18Ibido, colo 4780 
19Ibid o, colso 454, 4570 
20ibid o, colso 535-536, 5450 
21 Ibido __ , colo 562 .. 
22Ibid .. , colo 461 .. 
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' 1939, accepting the views of the "senior Foreign Office 
advisers that it was disastrous to rely on Hitler's good 
faith.tt23 On March 15, he imformed Henderson that Hit-
ler's word sho~ld. not be accepted on faith and that he did 
not believe that Hitler could be trusted.24 This change in 
attitude at the Foreign Office was based on earlier repor~s 
that indicated Hitler was preparing to moveo In early 
March, Newton, the ambassador to Prague, had reported that 
a crisis was coming between the Czechs and the S1ovakso25 
Phipps reported from Paris that he had been told that Czech-
oslovakia would be a German protectorate by the end of the 
year."26 On March 12, even Henderson warned that Germany 
was contemplating some form of intervention in Czech af-
fairs.27 
It is apparent that the Foreign Office was aw~re that 
Germany was preparing to strike soon, and it is safe to as-
sume that Halifax was aware that. Czechoslovakia was to be 
the victim. Why then were not preparations made to protest 
this flagrant disregard of the Munich Agreement? The answer 
is to be found in a Foreign Office memorandum of March 13, 
23 Bishop, p. 79. 
24DBFP _, Vol .. IV, P• 271. 
25Ibid., Po 183 0 
26Ibid., p. 222. 
27Ibid., p. 2.J2. 
1939 .. It was stated that if agression against Czechoslo-
vakia occurred and Britain were asked to live up to her 
guarantee of Czech boundaries r.igainst unprovoked attack, 
Britain would not be able to fulfill her obligations unless 
the French government took action, and it was unlikely that 
France would take any action.28 Halifax did, however, send 
a very mild note of caution to Germany on March 14, in which 
he asked Henderson to inform the German government that 
Britain desired that Germany not do anything that might 
disrupt the recent growth of general confidence. 29 On 
March 15, after Prague had been occupied, Halifax called in 
the German ambassador to Brita.in, Herbert von Dirksen, and 
told him that the proposed visit of the President of the 
Board of Trade to Germany was now cancellect.30 This was 
one of the first steps in the abandonment of appeasement. 
While the Foreign Office took some action, albeit minor, 
to inform Germany of its displeasure at the occupation of 
Prague, the Prime Minister was still dedicated to his for-
mer course .. 
When the Prime Minister spoke before the House of 
Commons on March 15, it was as though the occupation of 
Prague had changed nothing at all. Chamberlain insisted 
28 
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that the objective of his government would be to ttsubsti-
tute the method of discussion for the method of force in 
the settlement of differences.n31 The Prime Minister still 
believed discussion was the best means of preventing the 
outbreak of hostilities. 
The German -mbassador to Britain, Dirksen, reported 
to his government on March 15, that the general British 
governmental attitude toward the annexation of Czechoslo-
vakia was disapproving but moderate. It was Dirksen's 
estimation that this attitude was due to the traditional 
British slowness in making decisions and a desire to pre-
vent a recurrence of the September crisis.32 
Two days later in a. speech at Birmingham, however, 
Chamberlain expressed an attitude diametrically opposed 
to his sentiments' of the fifteenth. He acknowledged that 
the hopes of appeasement had been shattered by Hitler's 
aggression. He further a~knowledged that he had been 
wrong in his belief that Hitler was only attempting to 
include Germans in the Reich, as he proclaimed at Munich. 
Most important of all, he acknowledged that reliance could 
no longer be placed on assurances that Hitler gave so 
solemnly and broke so freely. ·He had finally realized 
31House of Commons Debates, 5th Series, 345, col. 
435-440. . 
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that Hitler was not a man of his wordo Chamberlain con= 
eluded by saying that Britain was willing to .accept the 
challenge that Hitler had laid before her and he kaew that 
he would have the support of all the ttBritish Empire and 
all other nations who value peace indeed, but who value 
freedom even more" in accepting, this challengeo.33 
What had happened to cause the Prime Minister to 
abandon appeasement 9 the basis of his foreing policy? One 
I 
factor was the reaction of the Conservative Party to his 
somewhat complacent attitude toward the &nnexation of Czech-
oslovakiao By the seventeenth of March, Chamberlain's own 
party was no longer willing to accept appeasement as the 
policy of the nationo34 One of the prime movers in con= 
vincing Chamberlain that he was faced with. a revolt from 
within the party was Halifax, who impressed the Prime Minis-
ter with the gravity of the situationo 
Halifax now began to assume a far greater position in 
the policy-making process of' the British government than he 
had held prior to this timeo When he had assumed the posi= 
tion of' Foreign Minister in March, 1938, Halif'ax had been 
willing to go along with the policy of' the Prime Ministero 
Now 9 however 9 he began to assume leadership in the determ= 
33House of Commons Debates, 5th Series, 345, colo 
435-4400 
34Ao Lo Rowse, Appeasement (New York: Wo Wo Norton, 
1961} B :po ·ggo ------- -
ination of foreign policy. The first instance in which 
this may be seen is in the speech Chamberlain delivered 
at Birmingham on March 170 Dirksen, in a report to the 
German government, asserted that it was Halifax who had 
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" taken a stand in the Cabinet for a sterher attitude toward 
GeI'DlQny, the results of which were seen in the Birmingham 
speech.35 
After the occupation of Prague, Halifax "put the is-
sue before Chamberlain with all the force at his commando" 
He impressed upon the Prime Minister "that the moment had 
come when Britain's att'1tude to further German aggression 
must be forcefully proclaimed, and that the Party, The 
House of Commons, and above all the British people demanded 
this should be done with no further delay.tt36 
Chamberlain's views were also affected by the changed 
attitude of Henderson, who had been a staunch supporter of 
appeasement. On March 16, Henderson reported that the an-
nexatio~ of Prague was going to prove to be a costly error, 
,,' 
for it would convince Germany's eastern neighbors that they 
must combine against a common foe.37 
The Prime Minister's response to the warnings of 
Halifax, the disillusionment of Henderson over Hitler's 
35DGFP, Series D, Vol. VI, PP• 36-390 
36The.Earl of Birkenhead, Halifax: the Life of L9rd 
Halifax (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1965), po 4320 
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aggression, and the altered tone of public and Parliamen-
tary opinion was the speech at Birminghamo On the same day 
that Chamberlain made this monumental speech, Halifax de-
livered a note of protest over the annexation of Czecho-
slovakia. to the German governmento Henderson was called 
home to report; he was never to return to Germanyo38 
Henderson's recall and the Birmingham speech marked 
a great change in the attitude of Britain toward Germanyo 
Appeasement was now a product of the past; the hope of the 
future was to be a form of collective security against Ger-
man aggressiono The new policy was not immediately evi-
denced in British diplomatic circles, for it was not known 
just what form of collective security would be best suited 
to serve as a deterrent to German aggressiono 
Once again Halifax led the wayo In an attempt to 
gain the Soviet Union as an ally of Britain he authorized 
Robert Vansittart, chief diplomatic advisor to the govern-
ment, to consult with Ivan Maisky, the Russian ambassador 
to Britain, about the Russian response to a German threat 
to Poland.39 The Soviet response to this inquiry was 1a 
proposal for a meeting of "anti-Fascist Powers'' at Bucha-
rest to determine wha.t action could be taken against any 
38Ibid., po 291. 
39Birkenhead, po 435. 
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future German aggression.40 The British Cabinet, because 
of a basic lack of trust in the capabilities of the Soviet 
Union, refused to accept this proposal but countered with 
one of their own on the twentieth of March. Chamberlain 
proposed a Four-Power Declaration by France, Britain, 
Russia, and Poland as the most feasible method of stopping 
Hitler. The draft of the Declaration read: 
We, the undersigned, duly authorized to 
that effect, hereby declare that inasmuch as 
peace and security in Europe are matters of 
common interest and concern, and since Euro-
pean peace and security may be affected by · 
any action which constitutes a threat to the 
political independence of any European State, 
our respective Governments hereby undertake 
immediate-ly to consult together as to what 
steps should be taken to offer joint resis-
tance to any such action.41 
Although Dirksen had been recalled to Germany, Theo-
dor Kordt, the Charge d'Affaires, continued to report to 
his government the changes in attitude within Britain. On. 
March 20, he reported that the British intentions had not 
yet clarified, but that it appeared the British were now 
willing to draw a demarcation line; any infringement of 
this would constitute a casus belli. He also emphasized 
that Halifax was ta.king the lead in this by calling for 
40E. H. Carr, German-Sovie Relations Between the ~~~------.+-__ ....... ______ --=,_..~--~-
Twp World Wars, 1919-1939 ew Harper Torch-ooks, 
1966), p. 128. ' 
41As quoted in Namier, p. 63. 
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"far-reaching mutual guaranteeson42 
Within Britain the shift in policy, whatever its ul-
timate result, was well receivedo The Archbishop of Can-
terbury said that Hitler was a threat to ttorder among na-
tions" and the ideas he represented had to be met and de-
feated for the "sake of the world itselfott43 A letter to 
the editor of The Times gave support for a policy that 
would convince Germany that if she did not cease her activ-
ities she would soon become embroiled in a waro44 The Econ-
omist, a journal of moderate liberal persuasion, was favor-
able to the idea of collective resistance.o.45 The conserva-
tive Spectator took the position that Hitler understood 
nothing but force, ahd that force was the only thing that 
might cause Germany to reconsider and take her place among 
the peaceful nations of the worldo46 
Support was also forthcoming from the Dominionso w~ 
Mo Hughesj Attorney-General of Australia, declared that 
"there could be no peace or security or progress in the 
world until the aggressor nations were confronted by reso-
42DGFP, Series D, Volo VI 9 ppo 50-510 
43The Times (London), March 27, 1939, p .. 9o 
44Ibido, March 25, 1939, po 8 .. 
45uEngland Awakes," The Economist CXXXIV (March 25, 
1939) ll Po 601 .. 
46n)Britain's Rejoind~_!_~~ The Spectator, CLXII (March 
24, 1939 , Po -4720 
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lute peoples barring their path with drawn· swordso·ff A rep-
resentative of the Canadian government pledged that an 
at~ack on Bri-tain would be considered an attack on Canadao47 
Parliament~ry reaction to the change in policy was 
also .favoral>le. For example, Robert Boothby, one of the 
more important Conservatives and .former supporter of ap-
peasement, warned Hitler that fftbere is not a man in these 
islands who would not rather die in battle than live in a 
world that accepts your standardso"46 
Reaction of the continental powers to Chamberlain's 
four-power pact was mixed. France agreed to the Declara-
tion and Russia said she·would accept it if both France and 
Poland would ·support the pact. The success or failure of 
the attempt to limit German aggression thus rested with 
Poland. On March 21, 1939, the proposa1·w~s given to the 
Polish Foreign Office .. On the twenty-third,.Poland re-
jected the proposal in favor o.f a bilateral· agreement with 
Britain .. ·49 
The reason .for Poland's rejection of the proposal 
lies within her history. Tl1e nltion has no natural fron-
tiers, and she had long been at the mercy of either Russia 
or Germany or both. The Poles distrusted both countries 
47"The Dom~nions and the Crisis," The Economist 
CXXXIV (March 25, 1939), p. 610 .... -·-- ·- ··--
4S~. t d · R k 226 .~o e. in oe, Po . •. 
49n • 9·1 94 1,am1er, pp o - • 
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and they feared that if Russian troops were admitted to Po-
lish territory, as they would have to be in case of war with 
Germany under the British proposal, it would be difficult 
to make them leave once the crisis had passedo 
Poland's refusal to accept the four-power pact and 
the British decision to accept a bilateral agreement with 
Poland was to have serious repercussionso The Soviet Union 
became convinced that Britain had no desire to come to an 
agreement with Russia, and was, in effect, attempting to 
settle European problems without consulting one of Europe's 
major powers. The effect of this was to make Russia will-
ing to come to an agreement with Germany.50 Thus the fate 
of Poland was sealed, and an opportunity to form a truly 
effective military balance to the German war machine was 
lost. 
On the same day that Poland rejected the four-power 
pact, Lithuania was forced to cede Memel to Germanyo This 
event was not entirely unexpected, for Germany had begun 
to apply the same tactics to Lithuania as she had earlier 
used on Czechoslovakia.o For example, on March 17, 1939, 
Halifax had received word from France that the French were 
expecting an immediate German move on Memelo On the eight-
eenth word came that German arms were being sent to Memel 
and that German troops were being sent to East Prussiao51 
50 Carr , po 1 2 $ o 
51DBFP, Volo IV, p. 363, 3690 
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Chamberlain's reaction to this in.formation was to announce 
to Parliament that Brita.in would resist any method that 
.forced independent states to give up their independence.52 
.An example o.f this new determination may be seen in Cham-
berlain's announcement to the House o.f Commons on March 29, 
that the Territorial Army would be doubled in size to 
340,000 men.53 In a.cco,rda.nce with this declaration and 
upon Poland's re.fusal to accept the Four-Power Declaration, 
Chamberlain declared on March 31, 1939, that Britain would 
support Poland i.f that nation were attacked by Germany. In 
the Prime Minister's words, 
in the event o.f any action which clearly threat-
ened Polish independence, and which the Polish 
Government accordingly considered it.vital to 
resist with their national .forces, His Majesty's 
Government would .feel themselves bound at once 
to lend the P5olish Government all support in their power. 4 
The oe·rman government had been in.formed by Kordt that 
the British Qttitude had sufficiently stiffened by the 
twenty-ninth of March that "aggression" would mean either 
the use of force or.the threat of force.55 So Chamberlain's 
announcement did not come as a complete surprise to the 
German leaders. 
52. · . Na.mi er, p. 117. 
53House oC Commons Debates, 5th Series, 345, col. 
2048. 
54 . 
Ibid. , col. 241 5. 
55DGFP, Series D, Vol. VI, pp. 150-151. 
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The reaction of Parliament to this announcement was 
favorable, although there were some who questioned Chamber-
lain's ability to lead the nationo Gallacher, the Commu-
nist, called for the formation of a government from all 
political partieso56 At this point the Labour opposition 
agreed to support the new course, but it would not be until 
1940 that the party would be willing to come into a coali-
tion government headed by Churchill. 
The government of Britain had now embarked upon a 
new policy t,hat was to involve her in a war which no ra-
tional person wanted. March 15, 1939, and the occupation 
of Prague marked the beginning of this new policyo It is 
doubtful if the British people would have tolerated another 
Munich, and Hitler was not going to moderate his actions 
because he was convinced that Britain would not fight, a 
supposition based upon BritainYs past actionso Chamber-
lain had pledged that Britain would meet any challenge that 
Germany might make, and the nation was preparing for the 
day it would have to make good that pledge. 




The semantics of appeasement have often been debated, 
as has been the role of Neville Chamberlain as a prac= 
titioner of the polieyo Was Chamberlain a fool to believe 
that Hitler was "open to sweet reasonableness"or wa5 he 
so convinced that it was unthinkabl~ that h~ was willing 
to go to any extreme to prevent such a catastrophe from 
occurring? The Prirqe Minister pr,sents .a pits.ble picture 
of a man who was dedicated to peaee and naive enough to 
believe that this was the desire of all statesmeno Cham-
berlain truly believed that Nazi Germany had some just 
claims to make upon the victoriou~ ~llies of World War I» 
and he felt that by satisfying these demands he was helping 
to launch the ~orld on a new era 9£ pe~~e and tranquillityo 
Appeasement, to Chamberlain 11 meant the just satisfaction of 
rea~onab1:e''elaims to be worked out by arbitration and not 
by use of forceo Had Hitler been willing to moderate his 
demands and limit his desire only to that territory which 
had historically been German, then appeasement might have 
been an ef£ective deterrent to waro 
However, .once Hitler embark,d upon the course of sub-
jecting ali 0£ Europe to German control, as witnessed by 
93 
94 
the occupation of Czechoslov.akia, Great Britain began to 
search out ways to halt German aggressiono Chamberlain's 
Birmingham speech of March 17, marks the end of the ap-
peasement era and the beginning of a new British policyo 
This new departure was in large part the handiwork of 
Halifax, who realized that the public, the Parliament, and 
the Party would no longer support continued appeasement 
after the occupation of Pragueo 
It was unfortunate that by this time Hitler had con-
vinced himself that Britain would not attempt to stop his 
plans. The German dictator would not heed the British warn-
ing that if he attacked Pol~nd the English would declare 
waro Hitler believed that if Poland resisted his demands 
he could obtain satisfaction through the use of the same 
tactics that gained him the Sudeten area at the Munich Con-
ferenceo However, British public opinion and Parliament 
would not accept another Municho Hitler failed to realize 
that Chamberlain was responsible to the people of Britain, 
and that even if he desired he could n9t continue a policy 
that did not have popular support. 
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